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ANTI-INNOVATION NORMS
Stephanie Plamondon Bair and Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña
ABSTRACT—Intellectual property (IP) scholars have recently turned their
attention to social norms—informal rules that emerge from and are enforced
by nonhierarchically organized social forces—as a promising way to spur
innovation in communities as diverse as the fashion industry and the opensource software movement. The narrative that has emerged celebrates social
norms’ ability to solve IP’s free-rider problem without incurring IP’s costs.
But this account does not fully consider the dark side of social norms.
In fact, certain social norms, when overenforced, can create substantial
barriers to the most socially beneficial creative pursuits. Because IP scholars
have left unexplored how social norms can hinder innovation in this way, the
harm they cause has gone unmitigated.
This Article sheds light on the dark side of innovation norms. It coins
the term “anti-innovation norms” to label these counterproductive social
forces. Using the double lens of sociology and psychology, it gives a full
theoretical account of three types of anti-innovation norms: research priority,
methodology, and evaluation norms—all of which interfere with socially
beneficial boundary-crossing innovation.
Our elucidation of anti-innovation norms has both theoretical and
policy implications. On the theory side, it suggests that IP scholars to date
have been too focused on addressing the free-rider problem. This has caused
them to overlook other barriers to innovation, like those posed by the set of
anti-innovation norms we describe here. This focus on free riding may also
help explain why innovation and norms scholars have paid little attention to
debates within the broader literature on law and social norms concerned with
identifying situations in which social norms are welfare reducing. On the
policy side, it points to innovation dilemmas that IP is not fully equipped to
solve. While changes to the IP doctrines of attribution and fair use in
copyright and nonobviousness in patent law can counteract anti-innovation
norms at the margin, a comprehensive solution requires innovation scholars
to broaden their vision beyond the IP toolkit. We take the first steps in this
direction, proposing a number of interventions, including novel funding
regimes and tax credits.
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INTRODUCTION
Innovation drives economic growth and is key to creating prosperous
societies.1 Much of the legal scholarship on innovation focuses on the role of
formal intellectual property (IP) law in promoting it.2 More recently,

1
See, e.g., Benjamin Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market,
61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 690 & n.73 (2014) (linking more innovation to greater social welfare).
2
See, e.g., John M. Golden, Robert P. Merges & Pamela Samuelson, The Path of IP Studies: Growth,
Diversification, and Hope, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1757, 1758 (2014) (“Focus on information and innovation
inevitably leads to concern with intellectual property.”).
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however, IP scholars have begun to examine the role that nonlegal factors,
and social norms in particular, play in innovative communities.3
The bulk of the existing scholarship on social norms and innovation
concerns IP’s “negative space”: innovative communities where creativity
flourishes despite a lack of formal IP protection.4 The upshot of this
groundbreaking literature is that social norms can, under the right conditions,
promote innovation by regulating copying behavior—a task traditionally
accomplished by formal IP rights. Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman’s
study of the fashion industry, for instance, highlights how innovation in
fashion design “flourishes despite a near-total lack of protection.”5 They
posit that a norm of tolerating copying behaviors leads to a fast fashion cycle
that generates markets for new designs.6 In the world of high cuisine,
Emmanuelle Fauchart and Eric von Hippel detail how a norm of shunning
copiers who fail to properly credit a recipe’s creator both protects novel
recipes and enhances the reputations of the chefs that originated them, thus
encouraging innovation without IP protection.7 Dotan Oliar and Christopher
Sprigman’s work with stand-up comedians strikingly illustrates how social
norms protect individuals’ jokes in the absence of IP by punishing violators
3
See infra Part I. By “social norms” we mean informal rules that emerge from and are enforced by
nonhierarchically organized social forces. This definition of social norms emerges from the work of
Robert Ellickson, which has been deeply influential in the IP studies we describe in this Article. ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 127 (1991). Social norms
should be understood in the context of other forms of regulation of social life, or what Lawrence Lessig
calls the “four types of constraint” on behavior: law, social norms, markets, and architecture. In contrast
to social norms’ nonhierarchical enforcement, law constrains behavior through the “centralized
enforcement of a state.” Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–64
(1998). This Article concerns primarily the interaction between social norms and law, although some of
our policy prescriptions involve regulation both through the market and architecture.
4
For recent summaries of IP’s negative-space literature, see Aaron Perzanowski & Kate Darling,
Introduction, in CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 1 (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman,
When Are IP Rights Necessary?: Evidence from Innovation in IP’s Negative Space, in 1 RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THEORY (Peter Menell & Ben
Depoorter eds., forthcoming 2018) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review) [hereinafter
Raustiala & Sprigman, Rights]; Christopher Jon Sprigman, Conclusion: Some Positive Thoughts about
IP’s Negative Space, in CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 249 (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017); see also the literature
cited infra notes 26, 66, and 67. We take a capacious view of the term “IP’s negative space” to include
both domains for which IP protection is currently unavailable and those in which creators choose to rely
on social norms, despite the availability of IP protection.
5
Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property
in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1762 (2006) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy
Paradox].
6
Id. at 1722.
7
Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case
of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI . 187, 187 (2008).
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with reputational sanctions, group boycotts, and sometimes even violence.8
And in his study of tattoo artists’ communities, Aaron Perzanowski uncovers
norms that punish the copying of only some types of tattoo designs (“custom
designs”) but allow the copying of others (“flash designs” and other visual
art from outside the tattoo community).9 Studies of other innovator
communities have similarly shown how creativity and innovation can
flourish without IP protection.10
Because granting IP rights is a socially costly endeavor,11 and because
social norms can be tailored to the needs of particular innovative
communities more easily than IP rights, negative-space scholars tend to
celebrate the ability of informal, low-cost social norms to promote
innovation without incurring IP’s costs.12 While acknowledging that the
social norms they describe can both over-reward and under-reward
innovators, scholars writing in the negative IP space largely leave these

8
Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of
Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1791
(2008).
9
Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 515, 557–67 (2013). Such
discrimination between custom and flash designs, Perzanowski argues, promotes innovation in the tattoo
artists’ community by both preserving a robust market for custom tattoos and fostering creativity by
sanctioning the free borrowing of preexisting designs from outside the community. Id. at 577–81.
10
See literature cited infra note 66.
11
IP rights generate deadweight loss, often require costly litigation for their enforcement, can create
thickets of rights that hinder commercialization efforts, and represent a one-size-fits-all solution to what
many analysts think is a problem that requires industry-specific interventions. See, e.g., Mark Lemley,
Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328 (2015) (summarizing the vast literature that
analyzes the efficiency of IP rights in fostering innovation).
12
See, e.g., David Fagundes, Talk Derby To Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing Roller
Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093, 1131, 1133 (2011) (arguing that nonlegal rules and norms
“are preferable to formal law, in the context of nonmarket production by identity-constitutive
communities” and emphasizing that “[p]revailing derby name norms also bring numerous efficiency
advantages to their users”); William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 373 (2011) (“By
overlooking social norms that promote invention and the effects of patents on these norms, the traditional
view of patent law omits an important aspect of motivations to invent.” (footnote omitted)); Gerard N.
Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Industry Norms, 2009 BYU L. REV. 875,
890 (“[T]here is every reason to think that these customs (as in the curve ball example) actually encourage
more sharing of knowledge and lower transaction costs in a way that makes the trade as a whole better
off.”); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1833 (“Comedians’ social norms provide significant protection
for creators’ incentives—protection that provides a baseline against which any contemplated introduction
of enhanced formal protections should be assessed.”); Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 4, at 3 (“[T]he
communities illustrated in this book demonstrate that creativity can thrive without legal incentives, and
perhaps more strikingly, that some creative communities prefer self-regulation to law.”); Raustiala &
Sprigman, Rights, supra note 4, at 7 (summarizing case studies in the negative IP space as “document[ing]
the powerful role social norms play in stimulating innovation and constraining appropriation”); Sprigman,
supra note 4, at 257 (arguing that IP’s negative space “turns out to be pretty positive from an economic
point of view, at least in some industries” and emphasizing that, rather than stymie innovation, the lack
of IP rights in the fashion industry “actually spurs [innovation]”).
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negative effects unexplored.13 Put differently, IP scholars have not paid much
attention to the ways in which social norms can reduce overall social welfare
by hampering innovation, and the ways in which law can mitigate these
harmful effects of social norms.14
This Article fills that gap in the existing literature by exploring the dark
side of social norms in innovator communities. Our work studying the
sociology and psychology of innovation suggests that some social norms can
mount substantial barriers to creative and innovative activities.15 We call
these counterproductive social forces “anti-innovation norms.”16 Antiinnovation norms can come in many forms.17 Here, we focus on a set of
norms that are particularly harmful from an innovation perspective: those
that interfere with boundary-crossing innovation (i.e., “boundarypreserving” social norms).18 The sociology and psychology literatures
converge on the insight that boundary-crossing work often yields some of
13

See infra notes 26, 66, 67 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 3, at 666 (contrasting Robert Ellickson’s “Old Chicago School”
analysis of law and social norms—which emphasized how social norms made law irrelevant—with the
“New Chicago School” approach—which sees social norms as an “object of law’s regulation”).
15
Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration: The Oncofertility
Consortium as an Emerging Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS
259 (Katherine J. Strandburg, Brett M. Frischmann & Michael J. Madison eds., 2017) [hereinafter
Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration]; Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and
the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 813 [hereinafter, Pedraza-Fariña, Sociology of
Innovation]; Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, The Social Origins of Innovation Failures, 70 SMU L. REV. 377
(2017) [hereinafter, Pedraza-Fariña, Social Origins].
16
The term “anti-innovation norms” refers to instances in which social norms, on balance, retard
innovation more than they foster it. The boundary-preserving social norms we examine in this Article
function as anti-innovation norms when they become overenforced—what we suggest is a likely outcome
absent policy interventions.
17
We suggest three broad categories of social norms with likely anti-innovation outcomes: (1)
boundary-preserving norms, (2) gender norms, and (3) seniority norms. Given the importance of
boundary crossing for breakthrough innovation, this Article will focus only on boundary-preserving
norms and leave work on other types of norms in innovation communities for future research. For work
on gender norms and innovation, see GENDER CODES: WHY WOMEN ARE LEAVING COMPUTING (Thomas
Misa ed., 2010); Dan L. Burk, Diversity Levers, 23 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 25 (2015); Dan L. Burk,
Do Patents Have Gender?, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 881 (2011); Dan L. Burk, Feminism
and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’ Y & L. 183 (2007); Nathan
Ensmenger, “Beards, Sandals, and Other Signs of Rugged Individualism”: Masculine Culture within the
Computing Professions, 30 OSIRIS 38, 44 (2015) (showing how “many computer programmers embraced
masculinity as a powerful resource for establishing their professional identity and authority”); Shelly
Wright, A Feminist Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art, 7 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 59 (1994). For
work on status and seniority norms, see Ronald Fischer, Rewarding Seniority: Exploring Cultural and
Organizational Predictors of Seniority Allocations, 148 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 167 (2008); Emmanuel Lazega
et al., Norms, Status and the Dynamics of Advice Networks: A Case Study, 34 SOCIAL NETWORKS 323
(2012).
18
Boundary-crossing innovation refers to the migration and recombination of ideas, methodologies,
and ways of framing problems across communities of innovators that do not routinely interact with each
other.
14
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the most significant and socially beneficial advances.19 Yet social norms that
prevent precisely this type of work from taking place feature in practically
all creative communities. Current IP and social norms scholarship, by
focusing almost exclusively on how social norms affect innovator behavior
within community boundaries, misses how in-group social norms can
hamper interactions across innovation communities. In other words, some
social norms that solve local, community-specific collective action problems
can also diminish overall social welfare by delaying boundary-crossing
innovation.20
This Article identifies and gives a full sociological and psychological
account of three anti-innovation norms. Specifically, we explain how (1)
research priority, (2) methodology, and (3) evaluation norms function in
innovative communities in both technology and the arts to prevent or
inefficiently delay important boundary-crossing innovation.21 Research
priority norms dictate which problems innovative communities prioritize for
study, methodology norms govern the methods used to study these problems,
and evaluation norms shape how innovator communities evaluate the work
of their members. These norms are initially established at the group level for
rational reasons: they serve as efficient coordination mechanisms that benefit
the group and its members. But due to individual-level psychological
biases—in particular, status quo and confirmation biases—they tend to be
overenforced, leading to anti-innovation inefficiencies.22 For example,
overenforcement of research priority norms that privileged a focus on light
and color, methodology norms that dictated working on unstretched,

19
See infra Section II.A. Both research within and across innovator community boundaries is
important for social welfare. In fact, the two are interrelated: ideas and techniques cannot migrate and
recombine from one community to another without each community having first developed deep
knowledge specialization. But the type of research that crosses boundaries is particularly likely to be
underproduced by the market. First, the gap between private and social value is likely larger in boundarycrossing innovation because of the large social spillovers that accompany breakthroughs. Second, success
in boundary-crossing innovation is often more uncertain, since it involves unfamiliar knowledge
recombinations. Third, and the topic of this paper, because of the reputational effects of boundarypreserving social norms, problems within a specialized community, and that community’s methodology
for addressing them, will be preferred by group members (including marginal members) over
intersectional problems or methodologies, even if both types of problems and methodologies (specialized
and intersectional) have the same social value.
20
Some community norms (such as norms of attribution and anti-copying norms) that are enforced
through shaming and reputational sanctions also run the risk of overenforcement through competition for
status or esteem. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL Norms 92–93 (2000) (describing how
punishments driven by reputational competition will often escalate beyond efficient deterrence levels);
Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 342
(1997) (describing how esteem competition can lead to overenforcement).
21
See infra Section II.B.
22
See infra Section I.B.
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unprimed canvasses, and evaluation norms that limited a judgment of “good”
to works that abided by these other norms in the 1940s Abstract
Expressionist community left little room for alternative approaches and
arguably delayed the emergence of Minimalism, Pop art, and other visual art
forms.23 In the realm of science and technology, astronomers strongly
enforced their intertwined research priority and methodology norms that
privileged the visual exploration of the skies through optics technology.
Community members who adhered to these norms flourished. In contrast,
astronomers who became interested in using radio waves to explore the skies
had difficulty publishing their research in recognized, peer-reviewed
journals, securing federal and private funding, and obtaining university and
industry employment. Yet, radio astronomy (many decades later) made it
possible to discover the existence of cosmic microwave background
radiation—providing evidence for the Big Bang theory of the universe.24
Our Article makes three primary contributions to the literature. First, in
contrast to the prevailing account in the innovation and norms literature, it
focuses on how social norms can hamper innovation and identifies three of
these anti-innovation norms.
Second, it marries insights from the sociology and psychology
literatures to give a complete theoretical account of these anti-innovation
norms.25 Our account both engages with and expands on the broader law and
social norms literature, which recognizes that social norms can be
overenforced in welfare-reducing ways.26 More specifically, we show how
the negative effects of research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms
on boundary-crossing innovation can be explained both under existing
signaling27 and esteem28 theories of social norms. Upholding a particular
innovator community’s research priorities and methodology tools—and
23

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.B.
25
See infra Sections III.B & III.C.
26
See infra Section III.C.2; see also, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOGIC OF GROUP
CONFLICT 72 (1997) (analyzing how certain group norms—“norms of exclusion”—can benefit group
members at the expense of both other groups and society as a whole); POSNER, supra note 20, at 92
(exploring the “pathologies of shaming,” which include excessive sanctions arising from the disconnect
between private and social gains from shaming); Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J.
ECON. PERSP. 99, 112–13 (1989) (analyzing how some norms “embody solutions to local collective action
problems” but “may work against the interest of society as a whole”); McAdams, supra note 20, at 342–
43 (developing an esteem theory of social norms that “identifies new situations in which norms reduce
social welfare”). Robert Ellickson—the author who most directly influenced IP’s negative-space
literature—while recognizing some negative features of social norms, is otherwise quite optimistic about
them. See McAdams, supra note 20, at 409 (remarking that both Richard Ellickson and Richard Cooter
“are fairly optimistic about norms”).
27
McAdams, supra note 20, at 342.
28
POSNER, supra note 20, at 58–61.
24
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shaming those who do not—can serve as a signal to other community
members of being a worthy, rigorous teammate. Under both signaling and
esteem models, core, high-status members of an innovator community have
a vested interest in enforcing norms on newcomers or marginal members to
maintain their status as rigorous community members. Esteem or status
competition, however, can ratchet up norm enforcement past its efficient
level by making it very costly to challenge the prevailing social norm.29 Thus,
what may start out as a mild preference for a particular research problem and
methodology can escalate to strong, inflexible preferences—leading to too
many individuals focusing on one particular problem with one particular
methodology and neglecting other, equally important problems from a social
welfare perspective. Our psychological analysis complements these two
models by positing a psychological mechanism for these behaviors.
Specifically, we propose that individual-level psychological biases—the
status quo bias and the conformity bias in particular—lead group members
to favor the existing research priorities and methodologies of the groups to
which they belong, blinding them to other possibilities and ultimately
leading to entrenchment and overenforcement of these norms.
Third, this Article proffers an explanation for why the legal literature
on innovation and social norms has to this point paid little attention to social
norms’ potential anti-innovation effects. We posit that it is because most
innovation scholars are focused on IP, and IP, in turn, is focused on
addressing—primarily through the regulation of copying—the market
failures that arise due to the public goods30 nature of innovation. Negativespace scholars have thus turned their attention to social norms as an
alternative device for solving the public goods (or free-rider) problem. But
there are other important barriers to innovation besides the free-rider
problem.31 In this Article, for example, the anti-innovation norms we identify
have nothing to do with the public goods nature of innovation and
29

See id.; McAdams, supra note 20, at 366.
See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY xi (3d ed. 2016) (“Why group [copyright, patent, and trademark law] together
then? The answer we will develop depends on a core similarity—the existence of a ‘good’—an invention,
a creative work, a logo—that multiple people can use at once and that it is hard to exclude others from.
(Economists refer to these as ‘public goods’ though they have more technical definitions of what those
are.)”); William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, Empirical, and Historical
Perspectives, in 37 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION, AND THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY,
BELEIDSSTUDIES
TECHNOLOGIE
ECONOMIE
(manuscript
at
1)
(2001),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Innovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2UU-9DKS] [hereinafter
Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation] (“We begin with some familiar generalizations:
Technological innovations belong to the category of objects and services that economists refer to as
‘public goods.’”).
31
See infra Section III.C.1
30
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unauthorized copying of intellectual products. Instead, these three antiinnovation norms function to prevent knowledge recombination across
community boundaries and therefore channel the types of innovation
produced by individuals and teams in suboptimal directions.
This insight has implications for innovation scholarship that go far
beyond the social norms literature. Specifically, if it is the goal of innovation
scholars to maximize socially beneficial innovation, they must begin to
reckon with other innovation dilemmas beyond the free-rider problem IP is
designed to address. Our conclusions have much in common with the work
of Brett Frischmann, Michael Madison, and Katherine Strandburg on
knowledge commons.32 These authors have also called for an analysis of
other social dilemmas in innovation.33 Our research complements their work
in two ways: first, by emphasizing the importance of understanding how
innovator communities interact (or fail to interact) with each other—not just
with the public at large—and, second, by highlighting the importance of
explicitly considering that boundary-preserving and other anti-innovation
norms can result in negative externalities associated with “knowledge
commons.”34
The Article is largely descriptive and theoretical, but its insights pave
the way for productive policy prescriptions. Specifically, the recognition that
anti-innovation norms operate beyond the free-rider problem suggests that

32
See, e.g., GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison &
Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2014) (offering a research framework to study knowledge commons, the
institutionalized community governance of the sharing and creation of intellectual and cultural resources);
id. (applying the authors’ framework for studying knowledge commons to case studies involving medical
professionals and information); Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg,
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 665–66 (2011)
(explaining the shortcomings of a functionalist account of IP and proposing a constructed-culturalcommons framework to complement the functionalist approach). Yochai Benkler, in his pioneering work
on commons-based production, has also analyzed how cooperation can emerge without formal (legal)
coordination. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s
Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002). In turn, these legal scholars
draw inspiration from earlier work by Elinor Ostrom on natural resources commons. See, e.g., ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1990). But see Michael Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 103, 120 (2012)
(describing how communities of innovation that share patents to facilitate innovation often require outside
catalysts—such as government funding and infrastructure—to coordinate sharing).
33
Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg, Governing Knowledge
Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1, 9 (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison &
Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2014) (arguing that “a myopic focus on the free-rider issue may distract
researchers and policy makers from other social dilemmas that may be more important in some contexts”).
34
Two questions that Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg include in their structured interview
framework are “What are the degree and nature of openness with respect to each type of community
member and the general public?” and “What costs and risks are associated with the commons, including
any negative externalities?” Id. at 20–21.
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IP law, which is designed primarily to address this problem, cannot fully
correct the inefficiencies created by these norms. This prompts us to broaden
our vision to consider other policy interventions beyond IP.
Taking the first steps in this direction, we offer some concrete policy
solutions that reach beyond the traditional IP-or-IP-substitute proposals and
chart new territory, with recommendations for novel funding regimes and
targeted tax credits for collaborative ventures.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I synthesizes IP’s negative-space
literature and the conventional wisdom to which it has given rise—namely,
that social norms in the innovation context are generally innovation
promoting. We then place work on IP and social norms within the larger
context of law and social norms scholarship. Part II challenges this
conventional wisdom. Drawing from our work studying the sociology and
psychology of innovation, we identify three anti-innovation norms and
describe how they work to stifle creativity by hindering boundary-crossing
innovation in both science and technology and the arts. This Part shows how
these three anti-innovation norms—research priority, methodology, and
evaluation norms—originally arise to solve coordination problems but, over
time, are overenforced as a result of psychological biases. Part III examines
the implications of anti-innovation norms for innovation policy and theory.
We posit that innovation scholarship has focused too narrowly on solving
the free-rider problem via IP or IP substitutes (like social norms). Because
anti-innovation norms operate beyond the free-rider problem, unique policy
solutions are required to adequately address them. Although changes to
specific IP doctrines, such as attribution rights in copyright and
nonobviousness in patent law, can help ameliorate the effects of antiinnovation norms, policy solutions beyond IP are needed to comprehensively
tackle their anti-innovation effects. We conclude by proposing some
preliminary policy interventions along these lines.
I.

SOCIAL NORMS AND INNOVATION

In the past two decades, legal scholars have rediscovered the power of
social norms to influence behavior.35 In areas as disparate as contracts and

35
Robert Ellickson’s seminal work Order without Law, which demonstrated the prevalence of
informal norms—and the irrelevance of legal rules—for achieving cooperative outcomes in close-knit
communities, has served as the starting point for much of the work in this area. ELLICKSON, supra note
3; see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55 (1963) (describing the emergence of informal contract norms among close-knit communities of
businessmen in Wisconsin, and laying the foundation for much of the work on relational contracts).
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commercial law,36 criminal law,37 torts,38 family law,39 and tax law,40 scholars
have uncovered the crucial role of social norms in regulating social behavior.
Emphasizing the centrality of social norms, and the irrelevance of legal rules,
these studies sparked a challenge of the prevailing “legal centralist” view of
human behavior, a view that placed “governments [as] the chief sources of
rules and enforcement efforts.”41
IP, however, was thought to be an exception to this pattern. While other
legal fields shifted their focus to understanding the interaction between law
and social norms, IP scholars remained focused on the importance of
governmental intervention to foster and maintain creativity and innovation.42
This traditional assumption is now being challenged. IP scholars have
recently identified myriad spaces where innovation proceeds apace without
IP protection.43 The finding that social norms can play a key role in
36

See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (analyzing the interplay between law and
social norms in merchant communities); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and
Economic Analysis, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (1997).
37
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for
Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999); Dan M. Kahan, What Do
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996).
38
See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
1 (1999).
39
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 256 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of
Marriage, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra at 201.
40
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV.
1781 (2000).
41
See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 4, 138; POSNER, supra note 20, at 4 (criticizing normative
and positive branches of law and economics for assuming that individuals “are unaffected by the attitudes
of others”—that is, by neglecting to consider that individuals often conform to social norms); Janice
Nadler, Expressive Law, Social Norms, and Social Groups, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 60, 61 (2017) (“In
contrast to the instrumental view that law operates on autonomous individuals by providing a set of
incentives, the social groups view holds that a person’s attitude and behavior regarding any number of
demands of law . . . is a product of the interaction of law, social influence, and motivational goals that are
shaped by that person’s commitments to specific in-groups.”).
42
See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 32, at 666 (“Intellectual property law
scholarship has typically viewed invention, creative expression, innovation, and related or subsidiary
activities (such as research and development) as a special set of practices for which extra encouragement
is warranted.”); Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS: CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS 131–32 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds.,
2000) (charting the history of economic thinking on IP that reinforced the importance of governmental
intervention to generate optimal levels of innovation). Studies on the role of social norms and innovation
have lagged behind studies in other legal areas by at least a decade. See, e.g., Raustiala & Sprigman,
Rights, supra note 4, at 2 (noting, in 2016, that the literature on social norms and innovation is “barely
more than a decade old”).
43
A recent collection of essays is illustrative of the range of industries where social norms are now
thought to foster innovation without IP or other governmental interventions. Perzanowski & Darling,
supra note 4 (containing essays that describe the centrality of social norms for innovation in cuisine,
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innovation processes is singularly important because it illustrates the reach
of social norms in an area where predictions of the centrality of governmental
intervention were thought to be most robust.44 In this part, we briefly describe
both work on IP and social norms and on the field of law and social norms
more broadly—emphasizing points of departure between the IP and social
norms literature and the broader literature on law and social norms.
Before we briefly summarize this literature, a note on what we mean by
“social norms” is in order. We adopt the classification put forth by Robert
Ellickson,45 whose work has served as a springboard for much of the work
on innovation without IP that we discuss here.46 Social norms are rules that
emerge from and are enforced by nonhierarchically organized social forces
(as opposed to organizations or governments, which promulgate
organizational rules and law, respectively).47 Much like organizational rules
or law, social norms influence behavior in three ways: (1) by rewarding good
(prosocial) behavior, (2) by ignoring ordinary behavior, and (3) by punishing
bad (antisocial) behavior.48 Rewards and punishments are not hierarchically
imposed; rather, they operate through an informal system of “vicarious selfhelp,” which includes gossip, shunning, reputational harms or benefits, and
may include violence in cases of egregious norm-breaking behavior.49 Thus,
identifying the content of social norms that operate in particular communities
requires recognizing the behaviors that such community labels as “good,”
“ordinary,” or “bad,” as well as the carrots and sticks that such communities
have developed to foster the good and dissuade the bad.
With these definitions in mind, we now turn to the literature on social
norms and innovation.
A. IP Law and Social Norms
The traditional justification for IP rights is utilitarian. IP is necessary to
incentivize the efficient production of information goods. Absent IP

medical devices and procedures, tattoo, roller derby, architecture, porn, and Nollywood (i.e., Nigerian)
films); see also infra note 154 and accompanying text.
44
See Menell, supra note 42, for a summary of the theoretical underpinnings of IP—focusing on the
need for governmental intervention to avert market failure.
45
ELLICKSON, supra note 3.
46
See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 12, at 1133 (“Ellickson’s Order Without Law is the cornerstone
non-legal centralist explanation for the evolution of extralegal norm systems as forms of governance.”);
Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 7, at 187; Raustiala & Sprigman, Rights, supra note 4, at 5 (“At a
foundational level this line of scholarship draws deeply from the well of ideas associated with Robert
Ellickson (1991) and his influential book, Order Without Law.”).
47
ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 127.
48
Id. at 124.
49
Id. at 131.
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protection, free riding by copyists would sharply limit financial returns to
creators, ultimately diminishing incentives to create information goods in the
first place.50 Despite the importance of this canonical story in shaping IP law
and policy, the empirical evidence that IP law functions in the world as this
traditional narrative predicts is, at best, inconclusive.51 In the past decade, a
growing body of work has emerged that points to the irrelevance of IP
protection for intellectual production, at least in a subset of creative fields.
These studies argue that social norms can create overlooked incentives to
innovate.52 Implicit in several of these studies—and as an explicit concern in
others—is the suggestion that social norms represent a superior coordinating
mechanism that provides tailored incentives to particular innovator
communities without the attendant deadweight loss, holdup concerns, and
high litigation costs that plague IP regimes.53
Case studies have found social norms play a key role in fostering and
maintaining creative output in a variety of fields including fashion, high-end
cuisine, stand-up comedy, tattoo, roller derby, open-source software, flu
vaccine research, and medicine, among others.54 Some of these communities,
50
See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11
(3d ed. 2003) (“Information has the characteristics of what economists call a ‘public good’—it may be
‘consumed’ by many people without depletion, and it is difficult to identify those who will not pay and
prevent them from using the information.”); Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation, supra note 30;
William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
OF PROPERTY 168, 169 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) [hereinafter Fisher, Theories of Intellectual
Property] (“The distinctive characteristics of most intellectual products . . . are that they are easily
replicated and that enjoyment of them by one person does not prevent enjoyment of them by other
persons.”); Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623,
631–32 (2012) (explaining how ideas are public goods: they are “copyable goods” that are “nonrivalrous”
and “nonexcludable”); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2004) (explaining that according to the traditional theory, in the absence
of IP protection people would prefer to copy others’ ideas rather than coming up with their own).
51
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 11, at 1335 (“[W]e have gone out, collected the evidence, and found
that it is far from clear that IP is doing the world more good than harm.”).
52
See, e.g., Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1832 (“None of the foundational theoretical studies
(as distinguished from recent studies in IP law that focus on particular creative communities)
meaningfully acknowledges the possibility that social norms can provide incentives to create.”);
Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 4, at 2 (arguing that IP law has “historically disregarded non-legal
regulatory tools that enable more granular, and potentially more effective, management of creative
incentives”); Raustiala & Sprigman, Rights, supra note 4, at 7 (“Many negative space studies have
documented the powerful role social norms play in stimulating innovation and constraining
appropriation.”).
53
See infra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
54
See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW
IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012); ROBERT SPOO, WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS: PIRACY, PUBLISHING,
AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (2013) (foreign literary works); Fagundes, supra note 12 (roller derby names);
Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 7 (French cuisine); Blake Fry, Why Typefaces Proliferate Without
Copyright Protection, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 425, 432–37 (2010) (typefaces); Hubbard, supra
note 12; Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians’ Intellectual Property Without Law, in
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such as the fashion industry and high-end cuisine, operate in an environment
where IP protection is unavailable.55 In other industries, such as stand-up
comedy, tattoo, and roller derby, IP protection is available but seldom used.56
In yet other industries, such as open-source software, flu vaccine research,
and medicine, participants actively discourage resort to IP law—despite it
being readily available—often through contractual devices.57
We identify two key takeaways from this literature. The first is that
creativity can and does routinely take place not through IP law but through
social norms. For example, in their study of stand-up comedians, Oliar and
Sprigman conceive of social norms as averting the risk of market failures in
the absence of IP rights.58 Similarly, Fauchart and von Hippel characterize
norm-based IP systems as “enabl[ing] innovators to establish and enforce
rights to some types of IP to their economic advantage.”59 And Perzanowski
and Darling characterize current research on innovation without IP as
revealing “the role that social norms, marketplace strategy, and architectural
changes can play in shaping an environment hospitable to creativity.”60 In
high-IP contexts, the social norms of openness and collaboration are also
innovation inducing. For example, Katherine Strandburg describes several
mechanisms by which the social norm of sharing in science-based industries
LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010) (magic tricks); Fiona
Murray et al., Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Effect of Openness on Innovation, 8 AM. ECON. J.:
ECON. POL. 212 (2016) (academic science); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8; Perzanowski, supra note 9;
Raustiala & Sprigman, Rights, supra note 4; Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What
Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
651, 653, 676–77 (2006) (jambands); Cathay Y. N. Smith, Street Art: An Analysis Under U.S. Intellectual
Property Law and Intellectual Property’s Negative Space Theory, 24 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. L. 259 (2014) (graffiti); Robert Spoo, Courtesy Paratexts: Informal Publishing Norms and the
Copyright Vacuum in Nineteenth-Century America, 69 STAN. L. REV. 637 (2017) (foreign literary works);
Katherine J. Strandburg, Legal but Unacceptable: Pallin v. Singer and Physician Patenting Norms, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss
& Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014). In her analysis of the flu vaccine network, Amy Kapczynski moves the
debate beyond the IP or social norms dichotomy, to emphasize that innovation can flourish without IP
but with other forms of governmental intervention. See Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual
Property Law: Open Science in Influenza 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539 (2017). Her emphasis on other
government-based interventions to promote innovation is in alignment with many of the policy proposals
we advance in Part III.
55
See, e.g., Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 7, at 187; Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox,
supra note 5.
56
See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 12; Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8; Perzanowski, supra note 9.
57
See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 54; Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open
Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197 (2002); Strandburg, supra note 54.
58
Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1860 (“Our study suggests that even in instances where, at least
initially, market failure seems likely, non-legal protections against unauthorized appropriation may later
develop and avert the risk of market failure.”).
59
Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 7, at 196–97.
60
Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 4, at 5 (emphasis added).
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fosters innovation, including by “boost[ing] a user innovator’s reputation
within the community and sometimes even among the broader public.”61
Similarly, openness and collaboration, tied to “recognition” rewards, are
postulated to enhance innovation in open-source software communities by
incentivizing individual programmers to devote their time to open-source
projects.62
A second important lesson from the literature on social norms and
innovation is that IP law does not function in a vacuum; rather, it functions
against background social norms.63 The fact that formal law and informal
norms coexist raises important questions about the impact of their interaction
on innovation. Formal law could work synergistically with social norms,
have no impact on the content of social norms, or undermine them.64 IP law
and norms scholars have been cautious about predicting the direction of this
interaction, although many have warned that IP law could diminish the
innovation-enhancing effects of social norms—for example, by displacing
cost-efficient, reputation-based norms with costly IP-rights regimes.65
Two advantages of social norms systems over IP law feature
prominently in most writings. First, social norms—unlike one-size-fits-all IP
regimes—can be tailored to the needs of particular innovator communities.66
61
Katherine J. Strandburg, Derogatory to Professional Character?: The Evolution of Physician AntiPatenting Norms, in CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 63, 64 (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017). Strandburg describes two additional
reasons why a “sharing norm” is innovation enhancing. First, “user innovators benefit from a sharing
norm because they can use the inventions shared by other community members. Second, by sharing their
inventions with the community, user innovators obtain feedback and suggestions for improvement.” Id.
at 63–64.
62
See, e.g., Lerner & Tirole, supra note 57, at 206.
63
Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1866 (“The case for intellectual property law . . . must explain
why non-legal regulation is inadequate, and why market failure is therefore likely in the absence of formal
legal regulation.”).
64
See, e.g., id. at 1832 (“If a non-IP incentive is present either generally or in a particular market or
creative practice, the marginal benefit of legal protection would thus be only the added creativity that
formal law induces above and beyond that preexisting baseline of incentives.”).
65
See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 12, at 1146 (“[T]here is something concerning about the increasing
likelihood that the foundation of our blackletter IP law is premised on an empirical fact about motivation
that does not match the way much (even if not all) modern creative production actually happens.”); Oliar
& Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1836 (“If enforcement of property rights among stand-up comedians shifted
toward the use of formal law (perhaps following changes in the copyright laws intended to encourage the
use of formal law by comedians), the costs of monitoring and enforcement might be much greater, and
could even displace the cost-effective informal enforcement customs that have developed over decades.”);
Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1744–45 (“[I]t is also likely true that a move to
a nominal high-IP regime in the United States is more likely to result in significant litigation compared
to the same move in Europe.”); Strandburg, supra note 61, at 64 (“Patents may be both costly and
dangerous to the viability of a user innovator community with a reputation-based sharing norm.”).
66
See, e.g., Horace E. Anderson, Jr., No Bitin’ Allowed: A Hip-Hop Copying Paradigm for All of Us,
20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 115, 117 (2011) (arguing that informal norms in the hip-hop community are
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Social norms carry with them the promise of adaptive flexibility while law
imposes significant uniformity costs.67 Indeed, the social norms that emerge
from studies in IP’s negative space are strikingly heterogeneous. In some
cases, such as the fashion industry, social norms treat copying as “ordinary
behavior” that is neither punished nor encouraged;68 in other cases, such as
high-end cuisine, social norms punish only exact copying and
misattribution.69 And yet in other cases, such as stand-up comedy, social
norms mimic and even expand prohibitions against copying present in
existing IP regimes.70 Finally, in open-sharing regimes, such as open-source
software and flu vaccine research, social norms actively encourage
information exchange.71 Second, enforcement costs in social norms regimes
are often significantly lower than in legal regimes. Litigation costs and
lengthy times to reaching a final verdict make legal enforcement in fact
inaccessible to many innovators.72
Although scholars recognize that the social norms at work in those
communities could have harmful effects on society at large, they leave these
negative effects largely unexplored. For example, Oliar and Sprigman briefly
consider the possibility that comedians’ social norms may have a “net

preferable to formal IP protection because community-tailored copying can distinguish “copying that
promotes ‘progress’ from copying that inhibits it”); Fagundes, supra note 12, at 1136 (“[T]he informal
manner in which derby girls enforce their name regulation rules creates a variety of flexible outcomes, in
contrast with the binary approach of formal law, which tends to require all-or-nothing, winner–loser
outcomes.”); Magliocca, supra note 12, at 877 (“[T]here should be a presumption against considering a
process patentable subject matter . . . when a norm can be found in the relevant industry against patenting
the class of innovation at issue.”); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1794 (“We emphasize that one
attractive feature of social norms is that they offer a way to order creative practices that do not fit well
within copyright law’s one-size-fits-all regime.”); Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 4, at 2 (“IP law
displays a troubling insensitivity to the specific needs of particular creative communities, and it has
historically disregarded non-legal regulatory tools that enable more granular, and potentially more
effective, management of creative incentives.”); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative
Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317, 346 (2011) [hereinafter Rosenblatt, IP’s Negative Space] (arguing
that in certain fields, “internal norms that differ from traditional IP” are “better suited to serving the
priorities of creators”); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Fear and Loathing: Shame, Shaming, and Intellectual
Property, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 41 (2013) [hereinafter Rosenblatt, Fear and Loathing] (“In negativespace communities, a lack of formal protection seems to benefit creation and innovation, at least partly
because participants in these communities are governed by customized rule sets enforced by conscience
and shame.”).
67
See, e.g., Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1839 (“[N]orms-based IP systems may be desirable
as a way of tailoring otherwise uniform IP rules.”).
68
Raustiala & Sprigman, Rights, supra note 4.
69
Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 7.
70
Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8.
71
Lerner & Tirole, supra note 57; Kapczynski, supra note 54.
72
See, e.g., Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 7, at 197.

1084

112:1069 (2018)

Anti-Innovation Norms

negative social welfare effect.”73 Perzanowski and Darling also note that
social norms may not produce an optimal balance of incentives and costs.74
And Elizabeth Rosenblatt recognizes that shaming and reputational
sanctions can be deeply damaging because they can “occur[] without regard
for due process or proportionality.”75 Theirs and other writings in the IP and
social norms scholarship largely sidestep this issue, however, often
emphasizing that because it is uncertain whether current levels of copyright
or patent protection are efficient, it is equally difficult to ascertain social
norms’ levels of efficiency.76 But in the realm of IP law, determining the
optimal length and scope of IP entitlements is an area of active empirical and
theoretical investigation.77 Theoretically, as Amy Kapczynski has pointed
73
Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1863; id. at 1836 (noting that “like formal IP law, norms-based
regulation of jokes may err either by underprotecting or overprotecting creators”).
74
Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 4, at 7 (“We cannot prove, nor do we claim, that communities
that rely on social norms or market-based responses to address information appropriation produce an
optimal balance of incentives and costs.”).
75
Rosenblatt, Fear and Loathing, supra note 66, at 39; see also Rosenblatt, IP’s Negative Space,
supra note 66, at 340 (noting that the very existence of social norms does not necessarily mean reliance
primarily on social norms would be the best way to promote innovation in a given field).
76
See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 12, at 404 (recognizing the important conflicts between the
traditional market-allocation justification for IP rights and reputation-based norm enforcement but
concluding that “[a]ddressing these conflicts is challenging because of the difficulty of measuring the
comparative costs and benefits related to inventing norms vis-à-vis those related to exclusive rights”);
Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1839 (“We lack the baseline to make a reliable determination because
we do not know whether formal copyright law is itself under- or over-protective with respect to any
particular creative product at issue here.”); Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 4, at 7 (“[I]n part, the
answer eludes us because IP policy has paid insufficient attention to isolating and measuring the
incentives at the core of the justification for the IP system.”). There are some important exceptions to this
lack of focus on the potential negative impact of social norms. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss has questioned
the ability of social norms to promote optimal levels of creativity, emphasizing the fragility of normbased systems and their dependence on homogeneous, tight-knit communities. Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property
Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437, 1458–62 (2010). Jennifer Rothman has more broadly questioned
efforts to interpret IP doctrines by reference to local customs, arguing that industry-developed customary
norms are likely to be suboptimal when compared with formal IP law. Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1906–07 (2007). And Amy
Kapczynski has criticized IP and social norms scholarship for generally neglecting to consider whether
individual communities’ social norms are efficient from a societal perspective. Kapczynski, supra note
54, at 1546.
77
Articles and books analyzing how to design an efficient patent and copyright systems are too many
to comprehensively list. For some examples of this literature, see SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION
AND INCENTIVES (2004); Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent
Reform, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 131 (2002); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S.
Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y. 531 (2000);
Joshua Lerner, The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis, 25 RAND J. ECON. 319 (1994);
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
839 (1990); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
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out in a related critique,78 IP law is often deemed efficient because it relies
on market signals to channel investments.79 This reliance on market signals
also provides a test for when IP law is likely to work poorly (for example,
when ability to pay is an inadequate signal of social need, or when there is a
wide disparity between private and social returns, or when distributive
concerns are normatively important).80 The efficiency of social norms, which
are often maintained by nonpecuniary rewards, cannot be tethered to the
same market signal rationale. This lack of emphasis on the potential antiinnovation effects of social norms is an important point of departure from
the broader law and social norms literature, in which scholars have focused
more extensively on identifying when social norms are likely to be
inefficient from a societal perspective, and to which we turn in the next
Section.81
B. Law and Social Norms
The broader literature on law and social norms is not quite as optimistic
as the IP literature about the power of norms to efficiently regulate social
behavior. Robert Ellickson and Robert Cooter recognized that norms that
increase the welfare of group members could harm outsiders and thus be
potentially detrimental to society at large.82 In Ellickson’s theory, social
norms emerge and are maintained because they are welfare maximizing for
the members of the group: whether to promote, ignore, or punish a particular
behavior is the result of a “subtle calculus of cost minimization” through
which community members “engage in more enforcement activity to
encourage cooperative behavior only if they expected that the marginal gains
from the additional cooperation would exceed the marginal costs of the
additional enforcement.”83 Notice also that we speak here of “communities”
78
Kapczynski, supra note 54, at 1546–47 (arguing that “[t]he norms literature has largely ignored
the question” of whether the types and quantity of innovation generated by social norms regimes is
efficient from a societal perspective).
79
See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19–
20 (1969); see also Kapczynski, supra note 54, at 1557–58.
80
See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 54, at 1557–60 (analyzing the contexts in which the market
allocation theory of patent law fails to produce efficient results).
81
See supra note 76. These other critiques, however, do not explore anti-innovation norms in depth,
nor do they analyze the sociological and psychological mechanisms that maintain their anti-innovation
effects.
82
See ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 169 (“[N]orms that add to the welfare of the members of a certain
group commonly impoverish, to a greater extent, outsiders to that group.”); Robert D. Cooter,
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1690–94 (1996); Robert Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory,
22 J.L. & SOC’Y. 50, 65–66 (1995); Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law
Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 224 (1994).
83
ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 173.
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as the locus where social norms emerge. The vast majority of social norms
are bounded: they are the product of particular communities linked together
by geography, cultural identity, or other defining factors.84 They also
generally apply only to community members.85 In fact, Ellickson limited his
theory of social norms to “close-knit” communities86: those in which
“informal power is broadly distributed among group members and the
information pertinent to informal control circulates easily among them.”87
Other theorists, however, have paid closer attention to social norms’
negative consequences for social welfare, including the social welfare of
group members themselves. For example, Richard McAdams has argued that
norms arise from and are maintained by individuals’ desire for the “esteem
of others”—i.e., their good opinion or respect.88 In this theory, social norms
can reduce social welfare in two situations. First, social norms are inefficient
when they do not arise to solve collective action problems.89 Second, social
norms can produce excessive (and thus inefficient) levels of conformity.90 In
this second situation, what McAdams terms “esteem competition” results in
norms that originally arise to solve a collective action problem being
overenforced, so that people carry out inefficiently high levels of a particular
activity.91 In McAdams’s model, norm overenforcement can take place
because esteem is a relative good (i.e., we seek esteem in comparison to
others), and because imposing esteem sanctions is relatively costless.92
Competition to be “well thought of” compared to others raises the cost of
noncompliance—i.e., the status loss from deviance—while simultaneously
decreasing the gains from compliance.93 Norm competition thus incentivizes
individuals to seek “high – or ‘hero’ – status by leading the way to new and
84
Of course, organizational rules and law are also bounded in that they apply to members of a
particular institution, or—depending on the type of law— a particular state or country.
85
But see ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 141 n.15 (“[N]orms (or perhaps self-enforced personal ethics)
can influence the interactions of parties who are not members of a close-knit group”).
86
ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 177 (“The hypothesis predicts that welfare-maximizing norms emerge
in close-knit settings but is agnostic about whether such norms can emerge in other social settings.”).
87
Id. at 177–78.
88
McAdams, supra note 20, at 342.
89
Id. at 412.
90
Id. at 419.
91
Id. at 371 n.123. When law and social norms scholars analyze whether a norm is “efficient” they
refer to either Pareto-efficiency or to the Kaldor-Hicks criteria for efficiency. Under the former, a norm
is efficient because it makes some or all members of the group better off and nobody worse off. Under
the latter, a social norm is efficient if those who benefit from the norm could—through their gains from
the new social norm—fully compensate those who do not (although no actual compensation need take
place). See id. at 409 n.235 (describing these two criteria as applied to law and social norms scholarship).
When we characterize a norm as “overenforced,” we use the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria.
92
Id. at 355–57.
93
Id. at 365–66.
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higher levels of norm compliance.”94 There is no necessary relationship,
however, between the optimal level of compliance with the norm (from a
societal perspective) and the norm equilibrium achieved through esteem
competition.95
Eric Posner develops a game-theoretic signaling theory of social norms
in which social norms function as costly signals to others that one is a
desirable cooperative partner, or a “good type.”96 Because any costly action
can be a signal (including behaviors that could be welfare reducing for
society at large), the private good obtained from sending a costly signal
(enhancement of reputation) is unrelated to whatever public good (or bad)
that might be produced as a consequence of the behavior used as a signal
(i.e., the resulting social norm).97 Social norms often impose a choice on good
types with “idiosyncratic tastes and values” who will either suppress these
tastes—to signal their good type—or satisfy them and be shunned.98
Russell Hardin takes a more pessimistic approach to social norms in
relationship with overall social welfare.99 Focusing on the role of social
norms on ethnic conflict, Hardin identifies two types of social norms: norms
of “exclusion” and “universalistic” norms.100 The former are norms that
“reinforce individual identification with the group and enhance the
separation of the group from the larger society or from another specific group
in the society.”101 The latter apply uniformly (or “universalistically”) to all
members of a society.102 Hardin argues that norms of exclusion are beneficial
to most individual group members and are driven by self-interest, but can be
very socially harmful.103 Norms of exclusion “work by changing the interests
of marginal [or fringe] group members to get them to act in conformity with

94

Id. at 366. “The result is that one individual’s decision to refrain from engaging in X has the
externality of raising the price that others must then pay for engaging in that behavior.” Id. at 367.
95
Id. at 420 n.273.
96
POSNER, supra note 20.
97
Id. at 24–25. While in McAdams’s model, sanctions (withholding esteem) are considered
relatively costless, in Posner’s model, signals are always costly. In addition to costly actions, signals can
include shunning others with idiosyncratic tastes or behaviors. Shunning is costly because it “cuts off
opportunities for cooperative gains and risks retaliation.” Id. at 25.
98
Id. at 27–28, 214.
99
HARDIN, supra note 26. Cf. Elster, supra note 26, at 100 (identifying situations in which a norm
may benefit the group but harm society as a whole, as well as situations in which a social norm does not
benefit anyone).
100
HARDIN, supra note 26, at 72 (Hardin defines these two types of norms as “those that redound to
the benefit of members of a more or less well-defined subgroup within a larger society, and those that
seem to apply universalistically to more or less all members of a society.”).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 72–73.
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the interests of the core of the group.”104 Why would fringe individuals adopt
the “core” norms or values of the group? Hardin gives us two reasons. First,
assuming that there is often a conflict of interest over limited resources
between groups, norms of exclusion allow coordination for access to limited
resources (such as state subsidies) for group members only.105 Second, norms
of exclusion serve an “epistemological” purpose: they preserve the “benefits
of comfort, familiarity, and easy communication in one’s group.”106 Here,
group preservation is a consumption good itself.107 Importantly, as in
Posner’s model, Hardin’s social norms are ultimately maintained because
they function as a signal (in Hardin’s model, to signal group identity).108 The
negative impact of norms of exclusion arises from their effect on both fringe
members and those ultimately excluded. Thus, maintaining the comforts of
familiarity “typically require[s] exclusion of those who make for
discomfort—often hateful exclusion.”109 And the economic benefit of access
to jobs and position requires exclusion of others on the basis of
nonmembership.110
Applying these theories to previous case studies on IP’s negative space
allows us to identify situations in which social norms are likely welfare
reducing and which merit closer study. For example, stand-up comedians’
norms that punish copying of even the very general premise for a joke and
that do not allow for independent invention could plausibly be the result of
inefficient norm overenforcement through esteem competition.111 When one
can obtain the esteem of peers by claiming to be an “honest” and “original”
comedian who never steals, esteem competition can make behavior that is
considered dishonest more and more extreme over time.112 And the behavior
of tattoo artists, whose norms sanction the free copying of art made by
104

Id. at 72.
Id. at 76–77 (“In a conflict in what is roughly a constant-sum game, at least for the short run,
some subgroup or coalition can benefit its members most quickly by excluding others from access to the
limited resources.”).
106
Id. at 77 (emphasis removed). When norms of exclusion serve an epistemological purpose, their
enforcement is often costless. As Hardin explains, “[t]hey are not sanctioning per se; rather, they are
merely acting in the interests of their comfort in familiarity or whatever and excluding those who are
unfamiliar.” Id. at 90.
107
Id. at 77.
108
Id. at 82 (“Once the convention is in place, I can most readily show my identity by following it.
The norm of using it becomes functional to identification with the group.”).
109
Id. at 217.
110
Id.
111
Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1823 (“Along these same lines, we heard from many of our
interviewees that appropriation of even very general comedic premises—anything that, even if at a high
level of generality, was not ‘stock’ or ‘commonplace’—was objectionable.”).
112
Id. (“Perhaps less so than any other creative form we can think of, comedians have little esteem
for even the most expert reworkings of others’ ideas.”).
105
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“outsiders” but not of original tattoos, while potentially a signal to
differentiate good from bad types within the tattoo community, may be a
behavior that diminishes overall social welfare once we take into account its
effect on those outsider artists whose work tattoo artists freely copy.113
Our goal in this Article is to widen current conceptualizations of social
norms in innovation to include both pro- and anti-innovation features of
these norms. The three types of norms we describe in the next Part of this
Article—research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms—while
serving an important coordinating and focusing function, also maintain
boundaries of particular innovator communities and prevent the productive
recombination of knowledge across them. Because knowledge
recombination across communities of innovators is crucial for breakthrough
innovation, these norms can result in important social costs. Anti-innovation
norms are reinforced by psychological processes that favor the status quo
and in-group conformity. We describe these processes in Part II, providing
the first scholarly synthesis in IP law of how psychological biases serve to
create and maintain sociological norms. Describing anti-innovation norms
opens the door for potential policy interventions to lessen their antiinnovation effects. These interventions can include, but are not limited to,
changes in IP law itself.
II. ANTI-INNOVATION NORMS
In this Part, we describe three types of social norms that are at work in
innovator communities: (1) research priority, (2) methodology, and (3)
evaluation norms. An important function of these three types of norms is to
erect and maintain boundaries between different innovator communities. In
turn, these boundaries prevent or inefficiently delay important boundarycrossing innovation.
Because an important role of these three norms is to establish difference
between communities of innovators, they could be characterized as norms of
“exclusion” in Hardin’s terminology. Nevertheless, as we explain in more
detail below, the effect of these norms on innovation is more complex. First,
by erecting boundaries between communities these norms serve at least one
positive social function: they increase specialized knowledge, allowing for
coordinated research on specific topics and faster accumulation of and access
to specialized knowledge. This welfare-enhancing effect differs from
Hardin’s norms of exclusion whose sole function is to increase benefits to
insiders by establishing difference and limiting opportunities to outsiders.

113
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But these types of norms have two crucial anti-innovation features.
First, sometimes they simply function to establish difference without
attendant social benefits. For example, they can give rise to specialized terms
that substitute for standard terminology for the sole purpose of differentiating
its users from those who do not use the special terminology.114 Second, these
norms run the constant risk of being excessively enforced. Excessive
enforcement of community boundaries leads to excessive specialization and
insufficient communication across boundaries. We show how excessive
enforcement takes place through subtle psychological biases (the status quo
bias and the conformity bias) that reinforce the boundary-preserving function
of these norms.
In our analysis below, we begin with a short synopsis of how
psychological and sociological accounts of innovation converge to show the
importance of boundary-crossing recombination for creativity. We then
describe in detail how research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms
function as anti-innovation norms by preventing such productive knowledge
recombination in a variety of creative industries. Our narrative combines
sociological and psychological insights. These two lenses provide both
macro and micro accounts of how social norms shape individual behavior.
In so doing, we expand upon the current theories of social norms in the legal
literature. Our account outlines a psychological mechanism through which
inefficient norms become internalized—and thus become unexamined,
implicit routines in innovator communities.
We conclude by offering some remarks on the theoretical implications
of anti-innovation norms. We link our discussion to broader debates in the
law and social norms literature—something the existing IP and social norms
literature has not sufficiently done—showing how our analysis of the
psychological bases of anti-innovation norms complements prevailing
models of norm development.
A. The Psychology and Sociology of Creativity and Innovation
Both psychology and sociology have long been interested in how
individuals and organizations access and recombine existing knowledge to
create new knowledge. We and others have written about this literature in
114
See HARDIN, supra note 26, at 79–80 (Hardin made this point about the development of slang in
some ethnic communities, noting that “some community-specific slang may . . . do no more than
substitute for standard terminology. Its effective function is, rather, to distinguish its users as users, to
signal their difference from those who do not use the special terminology.”); see also Dan L. Burk &
Jessica Reyman, Patents as Genre: A Prospectus, 26 LAW & LITERATURE 163, 164 (2014) (using genre
theory methodology to argue that the patent document itself—including its use of jargon—can be in part
understood as serving the social role of shaping and preserving the boundaries of the “patent
community”).
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previous work, and we provide only a short synopsis here.115 This rich and
varied scholarship converges on a singular insight: creativity (or
innovativeness) is enhanced through the recombination of knowledge from
distant domains.116 By distant domains, we mean simply knowledge from
specialized fields that are not routinely brought together.
Studies from network and organizational sociology have shown that
firms that are located in a “structural hole” in a knowledge network produce
more “innovative” products and have better ideas than their competitors.117
Structural holes are discontinuities in social relationships.118 If we imagine
communities of innovators as nodes in a knowledge network, information
developed within communities whose members interact routinely with each
other will flow quite readily among those community members (who are
connected by strong social ties) but will have a tendency to remain trapped
inside community boundaries. Therefore, firms that occupy structural
holes—or “brokers”—are in an enviable position: they have unique access
to knowledge from two (or more) communities that do not routinely interact
with each other.119 More recent sociological studies have further refined the
concept of a knowledge broker. Shifting the focus from a single organization
(or individual) to that of a team, recent network studies show that innovations
that are considered most creative by peers arise from teams with overlapping
memberships in distant knowledge domains.120 In other words, team
creativity requires both trust (from people who have previously worked
together, hence the need for overlap) and knowledge distance.121 Trust is
thought to be essential for distant communities to overcome the tensions that
arise when separate bodies of knowledge and different ways of

115
See, e.g., Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Innovation Inc., 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713 (2017);
Stephanie Plamondon Bair, The Psychology of Patent Protection, 48 CONN. L. REV. 297 (2015)
[hereinafter Bair, Psychology]; Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L.
REV. 1441 (2010); Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and
the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999 (2011); Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing
Interdisciplinary Collaboration, supra note 15; Pedraza-Fariña, Social Origins, supra note 15; PedrazaFariña, Sociology of Innovation, supra note 15.
116
By creativity or innovativeness, we mean a particular type of innovation that has a high social
value (and that people do in fact value).
117
See, e.g., Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes and Good Ideas, 110 AM. J. SOC. 349, 349–50, 353
(2004).
118
Id. at 353.
119
Id. at 353–55.
120
See, e.g., DAVID STARK, THE SENSE OF DISSONANCE: ACCOUNTS OF WORTH IN ECONOMIC LIFE
(2009); Mathijs de Vaan, David Stark & Balázs Vedres, Game Changer: The Topology of Creativity,
120 AM. J. SOC. 1144 (2015); Balázs Vedres & David Stark, Structural Folds: Generative Disruption in
Overlapping Groups, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1150 (2010).
121
de Vaan, Stark & Vedres, supra note 120, at 1154–55.
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understanding the world come into contact.122 Trust enables ongoing
communication between distant communities across structural holes.
Richard Lester and Michael Piore have called this process of ongoing
communication across structural holes an “interpretation” process.123 In
contrast to analytical problem-solving, which is goal driven and bounded by
a particular problem to be solved, interpretation requires the “capacity to
integrate across organizational, intellectual, and cultural boundaries”124 and
the capacity to “move forward in the face of uncertainty.”125 In most new
technologies and new art forms, analytical problem-solving comes after a
period of open-ended discussion and “play” with the possibilities arising
from potential combinations across existing community boundaries.126
Many of the most innovative contributions to society have been fueled
by this interpretive process across community boundaries. From the
discovery of the structure of DNA127 to the discovery of Big Bang radiation128
in the basic sciences; from the rise of designer jeans129 to new music and art
forms such as jazz, tango, and Pop art in the arts;130 and from cell phone
technology131 to new diagnostic technologies132 in applied science—
transformational advances in the arts and sciences tend to originate with
innovators working in areas outside their original fields of training or with
teams that combine expertise from distant domains.133

122

Id. at 1153.
RICHARD K. LESTER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INNOVATION—THE MISSING DIMENSION 53 (2004).
124
Id. at 5.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 54.
127
See, e.g., HORACE FREELAND JUDSON, THE EIGHTH DAY OF CREATION: MAKERS OF THE
REVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY (1979) (describing how the discovery of the double-helical structure of DNA
was enabled by the migration of physicists to biology).
128
See, e.g., Charles H. Townes, Resistance to Change and New Ideas in Physics: A Personal
Perspective, in PREMATURITY IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY: ON RESISTANCE AND NEGLECT 46, 46–47
(Ernest B. Hook ed., 2002) (describing how the application of radio engineering techniques to astronomy
led to the discovery of background radiation that provided evidence for the Big Bang theory).
129
LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 20 (explaining how this type of innovation involved
“crossing the boundaries that separated manufacturing . . . from the previously distinct industries of
textiles, laundering and finishing, and washing machines”).
130
DIANA CRANE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AVANT-GARDE: THE NEW YORK ART WORLD,
1940–1985, at 22 (1987).
131
LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 15–17 (explaining how the development of cell phone
technology was enabled by the combination of two-way radio and telephone engineering).
132
Id. at 21–23 (explaining how medical devices draw on both basic life sciences and clinical
practice).
133
LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 21–23 (explaining how medical devices draw on both basic
life sciences and clinical practice); DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, ORIGINS OF GENIUS: DARWINIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON CREATIVITY 125 (1999); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory,
123
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Psychological studies have also demonstrated how boundary-crossing
collaborations contribute to creativity and innovation.134 For example, as
Gregory Mandel has summarized in previous work, empirical work in
psychology shows that subjects exposed to dissimilar images tend to produce
more creative works (as judged by independent observers) than subjects who
do not receive this exposure.135
Innovators who cross boundaries are also judged as being more creative
by their peers. Scientists who have training or other experience outside of
their own narrow disciplines are more likely to be singled out by their
colleagues as creative.136 And those with the best reputations and highest
productivity are better able to call on a diversity of sources in their work.137
The cognitive basis for these results is the psychological concept of
“associative richness.”138 Associative richness refers to the ability of creative
people to draw unusual associations among seemingly unrelated concepts.139
For example, when asked to name a word related to “table,” a less creative
respondent might answer “chair.” A more creative respondent (evincing
greater associative richness) might respond instead with “elbow.”140 The idea
underlying the correlation of boundary-crossing collaboration with greater
creativity is that those engaged in these collaborations have a natural
exposure to a wider array of seemingly unrelated ideas and therefore greater
opportunities to express associative richness in their thinking.141
Despite its importance, the process of “interpretation” as Lester and
Piore put it, is “not widely understood or even fully recognized” in both
scholarly literature on innovation policy and actual managerial practice.142
We agree with Lester and Piore. In the next section, we show how the neglect
of the interpretive process in the legal academy stems from (1) the failure to
recognize the existence and importance of anti-innovation norms that
prevent conversations across community boundaries and (2) an overfocus on

40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1190 (2007); R. Keith Sawyer, Creativity, Innovation, and Obviousness,
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 461, 480–81 (2008).
134
See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 115, at 2013–16.
135
Id. at 2014 (citing SIMONTON, supra note 133, at 46).
136
Id. (citing TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 87 (1996)).
137
Id. (citing Sarnoff A. Mednick, The Associative Basis of the Creative Process, 69 PSYCHOL. REV.
220, 223 (1962)).
138
Id. at 2015.
139
Liane Gabora, Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying the Creative Process, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CREATIVITY AND COGNITION 126, 128 (T. Hewett & T.
Kavanaugh eds., 2002).
140
Id.
141
See Mandel, supra note 115, at 2015.
142
LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 8–9.
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addressing the free-rider and appropriability problems through innovation
policy.143
Despite the social benefits generated by knowledge recombination
across boundaries of inventor communities, specialized communities of
innovators develop social norms to preserve their boundaries. As we argue
below, these norms emerge initially out of rational self-interest, as they
function as coordination devices that benefit the group and its members.
Psychological processes embed these norms into community routines,
however, ultimately leading to their socially inefficient overenforcement.
Overenforcement of boundary-preserving social norms privileges narrow
analytical problem-solving inside community boundaries over open-ended
interpretation across them.
B. Three Types of Anti-Innovation Norms: Research Priority,
Methodology, and Evaluation Norms
1. Research Priority Norms
An important feature that distinguishes one community of innovators
or artists from another is which problems they prioritize for focus and study.
Research priority norms in different communities thus separate legitimate
from illegitimate research questions within that community. Identifying and
framing important problems worthy of scientific or artistic exploration is,
perhaps surprisingly, often more difficult than finding a solution to those
problems. As Charles Darwin is said to have remarked looking back on his
development of the theory of evolution: “I think it was more difficult to see
what the problems were than to solve them, so far as I have succeeded in
doing, and this seems to me rather curious.”144 For this reason, research
priority norms can serve an important focusing and coordinating function.
By specifying particular problems as especially worthy of study, research
priority norms guide community members to work together at solving them.
In turn, having multiple people focus on a solution for a particular problem
speeds up its resolution and provides deeper insights. This is the bright side
of research priority norms.
For example, in the basic sciences, astronomers’ research priority has
long been the observation of increasingly distant objects.145 This research
priority led to an intense focus in this community on the development of

143
See also Pedraza-Fariña, Social Origins, supra note 15, at 430–35 (discussing how patent law
undervalues the importance of problem-finding—often an “interpretive” undertaking—in innovation).
144
ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL RESEARCH AND THE PRACTICING PROFESSIONS 17–18 (Aaron
Rosenblatt & Thomas F. Gieryn eds., 1982).
145
See, e.g., Townes, supra note 128, at 46–47.
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better and more sophisticated optical telescopes.146 Similarly, in the
biological sciences, oncologists and cancer biologists have long been
interested in understanding the mechanisms that control cell division.147 Such
focus in cancer biology has led to a deeper understanding of how particular
genetic mutations that deregulate proliferation give rise to cancer.148 In the
telephone equipment industry, increasing voice quality and preventing
dropped calls was long a research priority.149 The majority of research in the
telephone industry was therefore focused on improving the “switch”
technology responsible for signal quality.150 Finally, in the art industry,
different communities of artists developed their own, distinct aesthetic
traditions.151 Each tradition prioritized different aesthetic problems and
techniques in its art.152 Take, for example, the two distinct groups within
Abstract Expressionism—the color-field painters and the gesture painters:
whereas the color-field painters prioritized the visual impact of light and
color, the gesture painters favored subjective, individualistic expression of
emotion.153 Much like the other innovator communities described in this
146
147

Id.
See, e.g., Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration, supra note 15, at 265–

67.
148

See, e.g., Douglas Hanahan & Robert A. Weinberg, The Hallmarks of Cancer, 100 CELL 57, 57
(2000) (“The barriers to development of cancer are embodied in a teleology: cancer cells have defects in
regulatory circuits that govern normal cell proliferation and homeostasis.”); Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña,
Mechanisms of Oncogenic Cooperation in Cancer Initiation and Metastasis, 79 YALE J. BIOLOGY &
MED. 95, 100 (2006) (“Understanding the mechanisms of oncogenic stimulation of proliferation and
death is important to dissect specific cancer-initiation pathways and to develop therapeutics.”).
149
See, e.g., LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 15–17.
150
Id.
151
See, e.g., CRANE, supra note 130, at 22 (“The fact that [art] styles generate a long-term
commitment on the part of some artists is an indication that each style reflects a distinctive ‘worldview’
composed of attitudes toward past and contemporary artistic achievements, appropriate subject matter,
and the acceptability of various techniques.”). It may seem odd to characterize expressive works as
addressing a particular “research priority” of their respective artistic communities. Yet, different
communities of artists do indeed have “preoccupations” or “priorities” that are examined through their
chosen means of expression. For example, the confrontation between Abstract Expressionists and Pop
artists had much to do with their differing preoccupations or research priorities. Abstract Expressionists
saw themselves as engaged in a struggle for individualistic self-expression in an often hostile, man-made
world. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEJA, REFRAMING ABSTRACT EXPRESSIONISM 3 (1993) (arguing that Abstract
Expressionist art had an “investment in the psyche of modern man, that it held forms and gestures to be
revelatory,” and “that it was somehow responsive to the terrors of the man-made world”); TILMAN
OSTERWOLD, POP ART 8 (2003) (characterizing Abstract Expressionism as focused on “subjectivism
and . . . self-realization”). In contrast, Pop artists were preoccupied with analyzing the intersection of life
and art, questioning the Abstract Expressionists’ subjectivist detachment from every-day life and objects,
and bringing together “high-brow” and “low-brow” topics. See, e.g., id. at 8 (Pop artists “responded to
the painting of subjective, psychosomatic mood with objective reflections of contingent reality which
they saw as symbols of life as it was lived.”).
152
Id.
153
Id. at 23.
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paragraph, the distinct research priorities of each group allowed the
emergence of a shared dialogue over the proper way to approach a canvas.154
But research priority norms have an important dark side that impedes
innovation. By emphasizing which research problems are worth studying
they exclude other problems from analysis. Of course, the problems that are
excluded by one community’s research norms may be emphasized in a
different community. The key exclusionary effect of research priority norms,
however, is felt when solving a problem falls at the intersection of two or
more communities, or simply outside any community’s research priorities.
When this is the case, research priority norms in effect deprioritize
intersectional problems. But as research from the sociology and psychology
of innovation shows, solving intersectional problems frequently generates as
large, and often greater, social benefits than those prioritized by each
innovator community. In other words, research priority norms act as antiinnovation norms when they are strongly enforced within a community, so
that members—and in particular marginal members—are discouraged from
focusing on intersectional problems. Note, however, that our argument does
not require that intersectional problems (or problems that require expertise
from more than a single community to be formulated and solved) be more
socially valuable than problems located within community boundaries.
Rather, we argue that—even assuming intersectional and internal problems
have the same social value—research priority norms will lead to an
overfocus on the latter and underfocus on the former type of problem. The
key to understanding this effect is to recognize that research priority,
methodology, and evaluation norms will inefficiently push fringe or
marginal innovators (who reside at the boundaries of their community) to
focus on “core” community problems, using “core” community
methodologies. This is precisely what happened in the creative communities
of astronomers, oncologists, telephone engineers, and Abstract
Expressionists described above.
The existence of social norms is best demonstrated through episodes of
enforcement: it is when transgressors are punished for deviating from
accepted research priorities that the underlying norm often becomes visible.
Take, for example, astronomers’ focus on optics technology and on the
visual exploration of the skies. The enforcement of the norm of visual
exploration took place through reputational sanctions and shunning
astronomers who became interested in using radio waves to explore the skies.
The deviant astronomers had difficulty publishing their research in
154
Id. at 62 (“The Abstract Expressionists redefined artistic conventions concerning the appropriate
way to approach the canvas. They did not begin with a subject, the subject emerged from their work on
the canvas.”).
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recognized, peer-reviewed journals, securing federal and private funding,
and obtaining university and industry employment.155 In contrast,
astronomers who followed priority norms were rewarded with reputational
and career-advancement benefits.156 In hindsight, however, the normbreaking astronomers’ were onto something: the discovery of Big Bang
radiation was made possible not by mainstream astronomers but by a radio
engineer at Bell Laboratories who had serendipitously trained his radio
antenna onto the skies.157
For their part, oncologists’ focus on cell division led to the development
of powerful chemotherapeutic drugs for cancer. These drugs, however, can
have very detrimental effects on fertility.158 Research on the impact of
chemotherapeutic drugs on fertility, however, fell at the intersection of two
communities: oncologists and endocrinologists. While oncologists
privileged understanding dysregulated cell division, endocrinologists
privileged understanding infertility in otherwise healthy women. The
intersectional problem of “chemotherapeutic-driven infertility” was
addressed by neither group.159 And efforts to address it were met with
important reputational and financial hurdles: neither the oncology nor the
endocrinology communities were willing to provide financial backing for
such projects.160 At the same time, research projects that fell squarely within
the research priorities of the respective oncology and endocrinology
communities were routinely rewarded with grant awards and job-promotion
opportunities.161
The ubiquitous cell phones that few of us could do without emerged at
the intersection of communities of telephone and radio engineers. One key
obstacle to the development of cell phone technology was the clashing
research priorities of these two communities. As Lester and Piore explain,
while signal quality was an “obsession” with telephone engineers, “[r]adio
engineers had a reputation in the industry as cowboys: their knowledge was
155
See, e.g., Townes, supra note 128, at 47–48 (describing how “big shot[s]” in astronomy strongly
discouraged emerging astronomers’ interest in radio waves and recounting how a faculty member in
Harvard’s astronomy department interested in radio astronomy was discouraged by the department from
pursuing this line of work).
156
See id.
157
Jansky’s important discovery, however, remained underappreciated both by engineers and
astronomers. In the words of an observer, “[n]either fish nor fowl, it was unable to be appreciated by
either the scientists or engineers, and therefore lay untouched as an isolated curiosity.” Woodruff T.
Sullivan, III, Karl Jansky and the Discovery of Extraterrestial Radio Waves, in THE EARLY YEARS OF
RADIO ASTRONOMY 3, 3 (W. T. Sullivan, III ed., 1984).
158
Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration, supra note 15, at 261.
159
Id. at 261–62.
160
See id. at 265–67.
161
Id. at 267.
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empirical, ad hoc, hands on. . . . Signal quality was often indifferent, fading
in and out; communications were frequently interrupted and lost.”162
Finally, the hegemony of Abstract Expressionist thinking in New York
City in the 1940s made it almost impossible for artists interested in less
abstract, more representational art to gain recognition. As Diana Crane
explains: “[A]t the very time that Abstract Expressionism was perceived as
exhausted and bankrupt, it simultaneously exerted a hegemony so absolute
that it offered young artists no room to maneuver.”163 Alternative approaches
to art, including Minimalism164 and Pop art,165 emerged in spite of such
hegemony due to performance events that brought together dancers, painters,
sculptors, musicians, and performing artists who developed a joint interest
in “translat[ing] real-life activities into art.”166 In these performance events,
research priority norms were relaxed and boundaries between communities
became fluid. In contrast to much of the dominant art world where aesthetic
ideologies and loyalties were narrowly drawn and mutually exclusive,
performance events allowed “visual artists [to] mingle[] as freely with
dancers and performing artists as with other painters and sculptors, with the
result that aesthetic influences moved easily back and forth across
disciplines.”167
2. Methodology Norms
Methodology norms (or how to study a problem) are as emblematic of
a community of innovators’ essence as are the research problems such
community chooses to address. In fact, under one interpretation of culture,
culture is defined by the particular tools and routines a community uses for
solving problems.168 Methodology norms are inextricably tied to research
priority norms. Often, research problems are prioritized based on what a
particular community’s methodology (or way of understanding the world)
can in fact study. Sociologists of science have called these “do-able

162

LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 16–17.
CRANE, supra note 130, at 25.
164
Id. at 27.
165
Id. at 32.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 31.
168
See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Alexander, Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance Between Ritual and
Strategy, 22 SOC. THEORY 527, 565–66 (2004); Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV.
SOC. 263, 264–65 (1997); Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 AM. SOC. REV.
273, 273 (1986) (defining culture as a “‘tool kit’ of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which
people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems”).
163
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problems,” that is, problems that can be solved with the tools that have been
developed and privileged in a particular community.169
For example, astronomers’ research priority norm of studying
increasingly distant stellar objects was coupled with (and influenced by) a
methodology norm of using optical telescopes as the right technology to
study the skies.170 Similarly, the methodologies and painting techniques
privileged by Abstract Expressionists—for example, allowing the
composition to simply emerge from their spontaneous work on the canvas—
were linked to their research priorities that emphasized individual selfexpression and rejected representation of the outside world.171
Much like research priority norms, methodology norms can serve a
positive social function by focusing and coordinating research efforts. But
they can also have a negative, anti-innovation side. When particular
methodologies become emblematic of a community’s identity, endorsing a
particular methodology often means excluding alternative, nonconforming
methodologies. Thus, astronomers first rejected what would later be known
as radio astronomy; telephone companies resisted using what they
considered inferior and often unreliable radio communication technology
and its more flexible, ad hoc trouble-shooting methods;172 and Abstract
Expressionists rejected Pop artists’ inclusion of representational, everyday
commercial objects and pictures in their work.173
Because intersectional problems are often best addressed by a
combination of methodologies, the kinds of exclusion described above can
have important negative social consequences. For example, in astronomy,
the combination of optical and radio telescopes has provided insights that
neither one of these approaches could provide on their own. While optical
astronomy is ideal for the detection of objects such as stars and galaxies that
emit a lot of visible light, radio astronomy allowed the detection of new types
of objects that are undetectable with optical telescopes, such as pulsars and
quasars.174 These insights were delayed by initial resistance to radio
astronomy techniques rooted in research priority and methodology norms of

169

Joan H. Fujimura, Constructing ‘Do-Able’ Problems in Cancer Research: Articulating
Alignment, 17 SOC. STUD. SCI. 257, 257 (1987).
170
See, e.g., Townes, supra note 128, at 47.
171
See, e.g., CRANE, supra note 130, at 62.
172
LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 16.
173
CRANE, supra note 130, at 62 (“With Abstract Expressionism, the modernist aesthetic tradition
became highly esoteric, excluding from its domain humanistic values, decoration, representation, and the
rapidly expanding phenomenon of popular culture.”).
174
See, e.g., Rene P Breton & Tom Hassall, The Future for Radio Astronomy, 54 ASTRONOMY &
GEOPHYSICS 6.36, 6.36–6.39 (2013).
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the astronomy community.175 In the development of cell phone technology,
the “deep-rooted” “cultural differences between radio and telephone
engineering” erected significant hurdles to collaboration and, more
specifically, to the modification of key telephone technology (the switch) for
use in the complex wireless cellular architecture.176 Finally, in the art world,
the cultural hegemony of Abstract Expressionism and its control over the arts
economy posed important obstacles to young artists who resisted what they
saw as Abstract Expressionists’ narcissistic tendencies and overfocus on art
as a therapeutic tool.177
There are two additional ways in which methodology norms can work
as anti-innovation norms. First, methodology norms narrow the types of
problems that a community will prioritize. While this narrowing can
sometimes be efficient by serving a focusing and coordinating function, it is
often inefficient. Prioritizing problems according to whether they can be
solved using available methodology runs the risk of prioritizing unimportant
problems (from a social welfare perspective) and deprioritizing problems
whose solution requires a combination of methodological skills that no
individual community alone possesses. The organizational sociology
literature that attempts to explain patterns of institutional change has
similarly emphasized the problem of methodology-bounded problems. As
Neil Fligstein explains: actors’ interpretations of key organizational
problems “will reflect their structural positions [i.e., group membership and
training], and their solutions will reflect the interests of those structural
positions.”178 It is not necessarily the most important organizational problems
that are being solved. Rather, which problems are prioritized and how they
are solved depends on actors’ methodological ability to solve them and their
power to impose their solution.179
Second, methodology norms can lead to the development of particular
community-specific “slang” or ways to describe a particular problem that,
over time, become inaccessible to outsiders.180 For this reason, many
innovator communities travel on parallel paths, searching for solutions to the
same problems but never realizing they are in fact working on the same
problems because the different “slangs” used to describe these problems
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Townes, supra note 128, at 47–48.
LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 17.
177
LAUREN RABINOVITZ, POINTS OF RESISTANCE: WOMEN, POWER & POLITICS IN THE NEW YORK
AVANT-GARDE CINEMA, 1943-71, at 108–09 (1991).
178
Neil Fligstein, The Spread of the Multidivisional Form Among Large Firms, 1919–1979, 50 AM.
SOC. REV. 377, 388 (1985).
179
Id. at 388–89.
180
See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 26, at 79–80.
176
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mask their similarities. A prominent example of this phenomenon arises in
the area of mathematics, in which the solution to a fifty-year-old conjecture
was finally achieved when a team of mathematicians and computer scientists
realized that two problems faced by computer scientists (a “graph
compression” problem) and one faced by mathematicians and physicists (a
“quantum physics” problem) were in fact different framings of the same
problem.181
3. Evaluation Norms
The final set of social norms that can impede innovation arise from how
innovator communities evaluate the worth of the work of their members.
Evaluation norms often serve to reinforce research priority and methodology
norms. What is considered good work by core community members reflects
the community’s research and methodological priorities and will create
incentives for marginal group members to conform to those priorities in
order to access the benefits of group membership. What types of evaluation
norms a community will favor varies, but there are six common types of
evaluation norms that are prevalent in innovator communities. Specifically,
good work is often considered the type of work that is: (1) patented, (2)
published in peer-reviewed journals, (3) published in specific peer-reviewed
journals, (4) vetted by core members of particular innovator communities,
(5) meets particular productivity standards, or (6) increases a company’s
market share. Much like research priority and methodology norms,
evaluation norms have a bright side: they reinforce a community’s good
practices in terms of methodology, they channel community members’
efforts to specific research priorities, and, in some instances, they reduce
search costs for “good” work.
Following our discussion of research and methodology norms, the dark
side of evaluation norms should come as no surprise: when overenforced,
evaluation norms inefficiently maintain research priority and methodological
blinders that prevent boundary-crossing innovations. Indeed, there is
increasing awareness on the part of funding agencies that communityspecific evaluation norms can discourage transdisciplinary research, and a
growing literature in innovation policy addressing how to develop better
evaluation norms.182 Two examples can clarify this point. The first continues

181

See Nikhil Srivastava, The Solution of the Kadison-Singer Problem, YOUTUBE (May 31, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnRHuuMjKrQ [https://perma.cc/UD88-CKNB] (video tutorial); see
also Pedraza-Fariña, Social Origins, supra note 15 (describing in detail the solution of this fifty-year old
mathematical problem, the Kadison-Singer problem).
182
See, e.g., Brian M. Belcher et al., Defining and Assessing Research Quality in a Transdisciplinary
Context, 25 RES. EVALUATION 1, 14 (2016) (“The lack of a standard and broadly applicable framework
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the story of efforts to investigate and treat infertility arising from cancer
treatments. The proposals of an enterprising group of scholars who wanted
to focus their research efforts on understanding the impact of
chemotherapeutic drugs on fertility were rejected by multiple funding
agencies. In the words of one of these researchers:
[Our project] was very good, but then the grants would fall between the cracks
because the portfolio for the NIH had no way to understand fertility in a cancer
setting. . . . It fit neither under the NCI [(National Cancer Institute)] nor the
NICHD [(National Institute for Child Health and Human Development)].183

In other words, the protocols each one of these agencies used for
evaluating which projects were worthy of funding reinforced the research
priorities of each community represented in each institute (cancer and
reproductive endocrinology, respectively).
The second example concerns efforts to translate basic research
findings into clinically relevant applications. Quite frequently, for basic
science to translate into clinical applications or marketable interventions
such as drugs or new methods of treatment, scientists must work closely with
their clinical or industry counterparts.184 This type of collaboration, however,
is often complicated by the different evaluation norms of the basic science,
clinical science, and industry communities. While researchers who focus on
basic science, typically housed at universities or research institutes, are
evaluated on the basis of the number and quality of peer-reviewed
publications featuring their research,185 their industry counterparts are often
discouraged from publishing their results; rather, “good work” in an industry
context is often reflected in the number of patents to an inventor’s name.186
As a consequence, academia–industry collaborations require an adjustment
of each community’s evaluation methods. For example, successful
biotechnology companies were able to attract academic scientists by relaxing
their secrecy requirements and allowing scientists to publish their findings
in peer-reviewed journals (thus maintaining their status as good academic

for the evaluation of quality in [transdisciplinary research, TDR] is perceived to cause an implicit or
explicit devaluation of high-quality TDR or may prevent quality TDR from being done.”).
183
Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration, supra note 15, at 23.
184
See, e.g., Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1521–39 (2012).
185
See, e.g., Chris Tachibana, New Tools for Measuring Academic Performance, SCI. MAG. (Feb.
10, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://www.sciencemag.org/features/2017/02/new-tools-measuring-academicperformance [https://perma.cc/D38Z-MPP9].
186
Mark G. Brown & Raynold A. Svenson, Measuring R&D Productivity, 31 RES. TECH. MGMT.
11, 11 (1998) (“Typical outputs [of an R&D lab] include patents, new products, new processes,
publications, or simply facts, principles, or knowledge that were unknown before.”).
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scientists).187 Conversely, in academic science, patents are increasingly being
used as a signal of productivity.188 Leaving aside worthy objections against
the propertization of academic science, this realignment of evaluation norms
to create a form of evaluation hybrid has been credited with the success of
biotechnology firms in Silicon Valley and Boston.189
4. Conclusion
This section summarized how (1) research priority, (2) methodology,
and (3) evaluation norms can have anti-innovation effects through their
overenforcement. How, then, do these norms emerge, and how are they
maintained in the first place? What leads to their overenforcement? The next
section provides a psychological account of anti-innovation norm
emergence. In so doing, we couple the macrolevel descriptions of innovator
behavior provided by social norms research with microlevel explanations
rooted in psychology.
C. The Psychological Underpinnings of Anti-Innovation Norms
How do particular social norms emerge in innovative communities, and
why do they persist even when they have anti-innovation effects? The
explanation lies partly in individual-level psychological biases. We posit that
an understanding of two biases in particular—the status quo bias and the
conformity bias—does much to explain the persistence of the anti-innovation
norms we discuss here. Though the biases, like the norms themselves, can
serve beneficial functions, they can also lead to entrenchment and
overenforcement of social norms that ultimately stymie innovationenhancing, boundary-crossing collaborations.

187
See, e.g., Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Spill Your (Trade) Secrets: Knowledge Networks as
Innovation Drivers, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1578 (2017) [hereinafter Pedraza-Fariña, Trade
Secrets].
188
See, e.g., Paul R. Sanberg et al., Changing the Academic Culture: Valuing Patents and
Commercialization Toward Tenure and Career Advancement, 111 PNAS 6542, 6543 (2014).
189
Pedraza-Fariña, Trade Secrets, supra note 187, at 1577–79.

1104

112:1069 (2018)

Anti-Innovation Norms

1. Psychological Biases Generally
Psychologists have long been aware that people are subject to bias in
their decisionmaking.190 These cognitive biases can impair judgment and lead
to suboptimal choices in a range of situations.191
During the lead-up to and aftermath of the 2016 presidential election,
for example, there was much talk in the media of confirmation bias: the
tendency for people to seek out and selectively remember information that
confirms their existing beliefs.192 Instead of basing political decisions on
rational thought, this propensity leads people to process information in ways
that are highly driven by emotional considerations.193 Commentators pointed
to the role the bias may have played in exacerbating the divide among voters
of different political stripes.194 Facebook—its algorithms designed to show
users stories it thinks they want to see based on their prior account
activities—was particularly targeted as an enabler and aggravator of

190
See, e.g., Benedetto De Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in the
Human Brain, 313 SCI. 684, 684 (2006) (noting humans’ “systematic biases in choice behavior”). Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky are widely credited with empirically elucidating the details of humans’
biased decisionmaking, based on earlier suggestions by the economist Herbert Simon. For examples of
their foundational work, see, for example, Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1329–36 (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 265–73 (1979);
Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive
Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49 (Thomas Gilovich
et al. eds., 2002); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208‒09 (1973). For examples of Simon’s work, see, for
example, Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99–100 (1955);
Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 493, 495
(1979).
191
Katherine L. Milkman et al., How Can Decision Making Be Improved?, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL.
SCI. 379, 379 (2009) (describing how biases can lead to costly errors in decisionmaking, like
“undersav[ing] for retirement, engag[ing] in needless conflict, marry[ing] the wrong partners, accept[ing]
the wrong jobs, and wrongly invad[ing] countries”). But see William S. Cooper, Decision Theory as a
Branch of Evolutionary Theory: A Biological Derivation of the Savage Axioms, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 395,
395 (1987) (arguing that cognitive biases may have an evolutionary basis such that “behavior previously
thought to be irrational might turn out to be biologically rational”); Martie G. Haselton & David C.
Funder, The Evolution of Accuracy and Bias in Social Judgment, in EVOLUTION AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 15, 16–17 (Mark Schaller et al. eds., 2006) (same).
192
See Michael Shermer, The Political Brain, SCI . AM . (Jul. 1, 2006),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-political-brain
[https://perma.cc/XJ9D-LDDF]
(describing research elucidating the neural underpinnings of confirmation bias in politics).
193
See id. (describing an experiment wherein subjects had their brains scanned while evaluating
statements made by Republican and Democratic presidential candidates—while parts of the brain
associated with logical reasoning were dormant during this task, areas associated with emotional
processing and reward were extremely active).
194
See, e.g., Scott Bixby, ‘The End of Trump’: How Facebook Deepens Millennials’ Confirmation
Bias,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
1,
2016,
8:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/oct/01/millennials-facebook-politics-bias-social-media [https://perma.cc/QX3P-7TED].
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confirmation bias.195 As an illustration, the Wall Street Journal constructed
“red” and “blue” Facebook feeds, the side-by-side comparison emphasizing,
in a striking way, how different the world looks from conservative and liberal
perspectives.196
The potential harms arising from confirmation bias in the political
sphere are many, including, on the individual level, a narrow and unrealistic
worldview,197 and on the societal level, a decreased capability for “shared
values and common discourse.”198 Scholars have written about the damage
confirmation bias can wreak in other areas as well, including scientific
research199 and criminal investigations.200
Confirmation bias is just a single example of how people systematically
depart from rational thinking. Psychologists have empirically identified
myriad other ways in which bias creeps into our decisionmaking.201
Our focus here is on how cognitive biases can lead to anti-innovation
norms. Specifically, the status quo bias and the conformity bias help explain
why research priorities, methodologies, and evaluation norms become
entrenched in ways detrimental to innovation.
2.

Status Quo Bias

a. The bias
The status quo bias describes the empirically identified tendency for
decisionmakers to prefer the current state of things over change, even when
195
See, e.g., Selena Larson, Facebook Shows You What You Want to See Post-Election, CNN MONEY
(Nov. 9, 2016, 9:39 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/09/technology/filter-bubbles-facebookelection/index.html [https://perma.cc/4NPE-TL2V]; Bixby, supra note 194.
196
Blue Feed, Red Feed: See Liberal Facebook and Conservative Facebook, Side by Side, WALL
STREET. J., http://graphics.wsj.com/blue-feed-red-feed [https://perma.cc/2J6X-LXK3].
197
Michelle Tang, I Know You Are and So Am I: The Dangers of Confirmation Bias, HUFFINGTON
POST (published Oct. 6, 2016, 2:13 PM; updated Dec. 6, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelletang/i-know-you-are-and-so-am-_b_12375786.html [https://perma.cc/FUD6-WW2L].
198
Ken Stern, Maybe the Right-Wing Media Isn’t Crazy, After All, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 3, 2016, 5:00
AM),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/11/the-right-wing-media-isnt-crazy
[https://perma.cc/H2CB-4PXD].
199
See, e.g., Daniele Fanelli, Do Pressures to Publish Increase Scientists’ Bias? An Empirical
Support
from
US
States
Data,
PLOS
ONE
(Apr.
21,
2010),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0010271 [https://perma.cc/6B3U-3ZGE] (describing how
scientists’ confirmation bias is exacerbated when there is high publication pressure).
200
See, e.g., Carole Hill et al., The Role of Confirmation Bias in Suspect Interviews: A Systematic
Evaluation, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 357, 365 (2008) (describing how expectations of
guilt lead to “self-fulfilling prophecy”-type suspect interviews); Saul M. Kassin et al., The Forensic
Confirmation Bias: Problems, Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY &
COGNITION 42, 45 (2013) (describing how the confirmation bias can corrupt lay witness memories and
forensic scientific results).
201
See, e.g., COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING,
JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY (Rüdiger F. Pohl ed., 2004) (describing a number of these biases).
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change would enhance utility.202 A person might prefer to stick with her
existing health plan, for example, though switching would result in
substantial economic and nonpecuniary benefits.203
There are a number of reasons why humans have this bias—some of
which serve completely rational ends. One of these ends is reducing
transition costs associated with a change, which might outweigh the benefits
of the switch.204 Relatedly, there might be advance uncertainty about the
utility to be gained from a change in any particular direction that makes the
move costly relative to the status quo.205
Apart from these rational reasons for favoring the status quo, there are
irrational psychological factors that may also contribute to the preference.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky famously demonstrated that people are
loss averse: when making decisions they give more weight to potential losses
than to potential gains of equal magnitude, and they weigh costs and benefits
relative to their individual starting point.206 A person contemplating a change
from the status quo may thus choose not to act even when the potential gains
outweigh the potential losses because she weighs the losses more heavily in
her analysis.207
Related to loss aversion is the phenomenon of regret avoidance.208
People try to avoid situations where it might appear, after the fact, that they
have made a wrong choice, even when the choice was in fact correct in light
of the then-available information.209 Indeed, as Kahneman and Tversky have
shown, people feel more regret when a loss in utility is the result of a new
action rather than an adherence to the status quo.210
Regret avoidance is influenced by, and helps entrench, existing social
norms. William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser offer the example of a
parent deciding whether to bring his infant along on a fifteen-minute trip to

202
William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988) (describing experiments revealing a status quo bias).
203
See id. at 26–31 (describing the results of an experiment in which subjects preferred to stay with
an existing hypothetical health plan despite demonstrated preferences for other options).
204
Id. at 33–34.
205
Id. at 34.
206
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341,
342 (1984).
207
Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 202, at 35–36. Interestingly, Samuelson and Zeckhauser
demonstrate experimentally that the status quo bias persists even in the absence of loss aversion. Thus,
though the status quo bias is consistent with loss aversion, it is not completely explained by it.
208
Id. at 38.
209
Id.
210
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preference, 246 SCI. AM. 160, 160
(1982).
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the grocery store.211 Although the risks to the infant of driving in the car are
higher than those of being left alone for a short time, the parent’s choice is
framed by regret avoidance, which in turn is framed by social norms. If
something happened to the infant while home alone, the parent, according to
prevailing social norms, would likely be perceived as having made the
“wrong” choice and would accordingly feel greater guilt and regret. This
interaction of social norms with regret avoidance will likely prompt the
parent to bring his baby along, though it is the objectively more dangerous
course of action.212 As more parents, driven by regret avoidance, make this
choice, the norm becomes further entrenched.
The concept of sunk costs is also a relevant factor here. A completely
rational actor would understand that previously incurred costs should not
determine future actions.213 But after large personal or financial investments,
real people may feel reluctant to cut their losses and may instead be tempted
to “throw good money after bad” in an attempt to redeem or justify their
initial course of action.214 This tendency too is driven in part by social
considerations. A person might be reluctant to admit to others, through a
change of course, that the original plan was a failure.215
A final reason for the status quo bias is the phenomenon of cognitive
dissonance avoidance—a desire to maintain a consistency of thought and
avoid conflicting ideas and beliefs.216 Because people like to think of
themselves as competent decisionmakers, they rationalize past decisions
(including bad ones) to conform to this belief.217 This colors future
decisionmaking as well.218 If someone has rationalized to herself that a past
mistake was in fact a good decision in order to avoid cognitive dissonance,
she may believe that a corrective or alternative course of action is
unnecessary.219
b. How the status quo bias leads to anti-innovation norms
We explained previously that research priority, methodology, and
evaluation norms can become entrenched and overenforced in innovative

211

Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 202, at 38.
Id.
213
E.g., Vernon L. Smith, Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, 99 J.
POL. ECON. 877, 890 (1991) (“According to the usual interpretation of economic theory, the optimizing
firm or individual should ignore sunk costs in weighing gains and losses at the margin . . . .”).
214
Id. at 890–91; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 202, at 37.
215
Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 202, at 37; Smith, supra note 213, at 890–91.
216
Id. at 38–39.
217
Id. at 39.
218
Id.
219
See id.
212
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communities, leading to suboptimal innovation. Though these norms serve
legitimate purposes, it is community members’ unwillingness to depart from
them even when doing so would be socially beneficial that is troubling. The
status quo bias helps explain this reluctance.
Take, for instance, research priorities. In a world of scarce time and
resources, each innovative community must prioritize particular types of
projects over others. Thus, astronomers focused on optics, oncologists
prioritized cell division, the telephone industry drilled down on voice quality,
and Abstract Expressionists emphasized subjective, individualistic
expression. But why did these priorities become so entrenched in their
respective communities that group members ignored, and were sometimes
even overtly hostile to, other possibilities? A simple, partial explanation is
that group members were all biased toward maintaining the status quo.
The mechanisms underlying the status quo bias help us understand why.
Consider transition costs. Adopting new research priorities, or even
collaborating with those whose priorities are different from yours, entails
significant transition costs. These costs may include, but are not limited to,
the efforts required to define new priorities, reconcile disparate practice
styles, and learn the unique language and terminology that tends to evolve in
particular communities.220 For instance, an oncologist trained in cell division
has most likely spent most of her career learning the techniques and language
of cell biology, and probably knows very little about the techniques and
language of endocrinology. Investing the time and effort required to learn
enough about endocrinology to enable a successful collaboration incurs
opportunity costs that, when coupled with uncertain benefits,221 may seem
prohibitive.222 The oncologist could simply spend that time and effort
pursuing more familiar research questions with more predictable—though
perhaps lower—payoffs.
The psychological factors that contribute to a preference for the status
quo also help explain research priority norms. Loss aversion will cause the
risks one incurs by branching out in a new direction to loom larger than the
prospective gains. This skewed cost–benefit analysis is exacerbated by the
desire to avoid the enhanced regret that follows when failure results from a
departure from accepted norms. Thus, the Abstract Expressionist who
chooses to buck the status quo by pursuing more realist avenues will be
judged more harshly by her peers and will feel more regret if the endeavor
fails than if she had taken no such action.223 It is much safer from her
220
221
222
223

Pedraza-Fariña, Social Origins, supra note 15, at 417–22.
See id.
Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 202, at 26–31.
Cf. id. at 38 (arguing that regret avoidance is one cause of status quo bias).
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perspective not to follow this course of action in the first place, even if
creative gains are sacrificed. 224
These psychological factors may also be amplified in community
settings. Loss aversion will wield a particularly strong influence when the
potential losses are comparatively large and may affect multiple people
beyond the actor.225 Likewise, regret avoidance, driven by social norms, may
play an outsized role when the actor is being “watched” by various parties
inside and outside the community, including colleagues, employees,
competitors, stockholders, and commentators. The actor might thus prefer to
maintain the status quo rather than move in a novel and innovative direction,
even when the new course will likely result in creative and economic
benefits. If failure occurs, the actor who maintained the accepted status
quo—like the parent who brings his child on the short errand—will be judged
less harshly by others and will experience less regret.226
The sunk costs fallacy and a desire to avoid cognitive dissonance also
likely contribute to the entrenchment and overenforcement of research
priority norms. An actor who pursues an initial course of action may be
particularly reluctant to change direction, not only out of an unwillingness to
cut his losses, but also because a change might suggest to observers inside
and outside his community that his initial efforts were misguided.227
Cognitive dissonance avoidance will exacerbate this reluctance if a
decisionmaker has internalized and rationalized his previous decisions.228
The astronomer who has devoted his career to a visual exploration of the
skies may thus be unwilling to try something new—radio waves, for
example—even if his efforts are not yielding results, because doing so might
be experienced as a painful admission to others—and himself—that his life’s
work was a waste of time.
Importantly, this line of thinking also gives the astronomer an incentive
to prevent others from trying something new as well.229 To maintain the
perception that his efforts were not misguided, it is necessary that those
around him act in ways that support this view. Scaling up to the population
224
Samuelson and Zeckhauser offer up Copernicus as a real-life example of the harsh judgment that
results when an innovator attempts to buck the status quo. Copernicus was deemed mad by his peers for
suggesting that the earth revolved around the sun and not vice versa. Id. at 46–47.
225
See id. at 35–36.
226
Id. at 38 (discussing organizational decisionmaking and regret avoidance).
227
Id. at 37–38.
228
See id. at 38–39.
229
This is a case in which “other-regarding” preferences can be quite strong, because they are
synergistic with “self-regarding” preferences. Cf. McAdams, supra note 20, at 414–15 (using the esteemtheory of norms to explain how majorities “may impose their other-regarding preferences on minorities
through norms, even when doing so is not efficient”).
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level gives you a community of astronomers who have each invested
significant resources in a particular research priority, and who each have
strong psychological incentives to maintain the perception that this was the
right course of action. It is easy to see how norms that operate to prevent
others from adopting different research priorities become stringently
enforced in these communities, to the potential detriment of innovation.230
Though we focus here on how the status quo bias leads to the
entrenchment and overenforcement of research priority norms, the same
analysis applies to methodological and evaluation norms. Just as transition
costs, loss aversion, regret avoidance, cognitive dissonance avoidance, and
an irrational approach to sunk costs help explain why communities become
reluctant to adopt new research priorities, so too do they help us understand
why these same communities stick with established methodologies and
evaluation norms. The short answer is that it is both physically and
psychologically costly to do otherwise.
3.

Conformity Bias

a. The bias
The conformity bias describes a tendency to forego independent and
autonomous decisionmaking in favor of following social norms.231 Everyday
manifestations of the bias can be seen in humans’ shared propensity to wear
the same style of clothing worn by their peers, frequent the same restaurants
as them, listen to the music they listen to, and otherwise conform their
behavior to the norms of their social group.232
Although some of the social psychology literature equates the
conformity bias with mere susceptibility to social influence, other scholars
have pointed out that the bias is in fact a complex and multifaceted
phenomenon.233 Under this more sophisticated view of conformity, the
degree to which an actor conforms in any given situation will depend equally
on the decision to be made and the goals of the decisionmaker.234 Broadly
speaking, however, the tendency toward conformity has been empirically
230
An interesting question that has not yet been addressed by the empirical literature is whether
members of certain communities are more prone to these psychological biases than others. For example,
we might expect certain communities (e.g., attorneys) to attract people who are more risk averse while
others (e.g., the visual arts) might attract people who are less risk averse. If this is in fact the case, it would
influence our analysis, but further work is needed.
231
Divya Padalia, Conformity Bias: A Fact or Experimental Artifact?, 59 PSYCHOL. STUD. 223, 223
(2014).
232
Mirre Stallen et al., Peer Influence: Neural Mechanisms Underlying In-Group Conformity,
FRONTIERS HUMAN NEUROSCI., March 2013, at 1, 5.
233
Padalia, supra note 231, at 225.
234
Id. at 226.
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demonstrated over a swath of behaviors ranging from the commonplace to
the criminal.235
That said, conformity is not necessarily an undesirable characteristic.
Indeed, evolution may have favored conformist behaviors because they
contributed to humans’ survival.236 For one thing, conformity reduces
information costs by harnessing the wisdom of the group.237 If a large number
of people are acting in a particular way, a logical conclusion for any given
individual considering a particular course of action is that the group’s
behavior is safe or otherwise beneficial.238 The actor can thus use the group’s
behavior as a heuristic for appropriate behavior without having to reinvent
the wheel by researching various courses of action himself.239
Conformity also plays an identity signaling role.240 Group membership
carries with it numerous physical and psychological benefits, including
protection, shared resources, validation of belief systems, a sense of selfworth, a sense of belonging, and the achievement of shared goals through
collective action.241 One obvious way to signal belonging to a particular
group is through conformity to that group’s norms and behaviors.242
Yet while the conformity bias often produces tangible benefits, it can
also at times lead people astray.243 In the creative fields, the tendency toward
conformity can lead to anti-innovation norms.
b. How the conformity bias leads to anti-innovation norms
An understanding of conformity and its underlying mechanisms helps
explain how research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms can
become entrenched and overenforced in innovative communities. To
illustrate, consider methodology norms. As we have explained, particular
235
Stallen et al., supra note 232, at 1 (stating that the bias has been observed even in situations where
“identity signaling is not an issue,” such as energy conversation, and noting that policymakers have
attempted—with mixed results—to harness the bias to curb antisocial behaviors like littering, drug use,
and violence).
236
See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of Conformity, 102 J. POL. ECON. 841, 843 (1994);
Julie C. Coultas, When in Rome . . . An Evolutionary Perspective on Conformity, 7 GROUP PROCESSES &
INTERGROUP REL. 317, 319 (2004) (hypothesizing that “conformity probably evolved as a cheap heuristic
for selecting adaptive behaviour”).
237
See Coultas, supra note 236, at 319.
238
Id.
239
See id. at 318.
240
Stallen et al., supra note 232, at 1.
241
Megan L. Knowles & Wendi L. Gardner, Benefits of Membership: The Activation and
Amplification of Group Identities in Response to Social Rejection, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1200, 1200 (2008); cf. HARDIN, supra note 26, at 77 (describing the “epistemological benefits” of
group membership).
242
Stallen et al., supra note 232, at 1.
243
See id. at 319 (discussing how conformity might lead to maladaptive behaviors generally).
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creative groups often prioritize specific methodologies and reject others.
Astronomers prioritized optic methods while rejecting radio astronomical
methodologies,244 telephone companies were reluctant to look beyond their
own methods to radio communication technologies,245 and Abstract
Expressionists emphasized the creation of abstract and individualistic
designs on unstretched and unprimed canvasses while resisting Pop-artists’
use of representational objects and pictures.246 How might a tendency toward
conformity have contributed to these groups’ unwillingness to embrace
different methodologies—a reluctance that delayed important creative
advances?
Consider, first, the information-cost-reducing function of conformity.
Imagine you are a novice astronomer just beginning your graduate studies.
Your uncommonly flexible supervisor gives you complete independence to
devise your own research agenda, using whatever methodologies you see fit.
Even assuming that practicalities like the availability of specific lab
equipment pose no obstacle, it would not be surprising if you chose an
agenda that made use of the optic methodology predominant in your field.
Why?
After reading the leading papers in the field, talking to colleagues, and
doing the other necessary legwork, you likely (consciously or
unconsciously) made an assumption. You assumed that the optic
methodology used by your colleagues, the leaders in the field, and every
other astronomer you had ever heard of, was the most productive—if not the
only reasonable—course of action. In other words, you made use of the
collective wisdom to reduce your own information costs. Although you did
some research to reach this conclusion, you did not investigate all possible
methodologies, study their pros and cons, etc. You saved yourself a lot of
time and effort by relying on the conformity heuristic. If you represent the
typical graduate student, it is easy to see how a social norm prioritizing a
predominant research methodology quickly becomes entrenched in this way.
Consider next the identity-signaling function of conformity. Now
imagine that you are a young artist in the 1940s trying to break into the New
York art scene. Your identity as an artist is not fully formed, but you
recognize (consciously or unconsciously) the advantages of belonging to a
group of like-minded creators—networking opportunities, mentorship, and
a sense of belonging, to name a few. All the artists you know belong to the
Abstract Expressionist school, and they all use specific methods in their

244
245
246

Townes, supra note 128, at 48.
LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 16.
CRANE, supra note 130, at 62.

1113

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

work: they all work on unstretched, unprimed canvasses, and they all
emphasize abstract, individualistic expression. At the same time, they reject
more realistic forms of expression; indeed, they seem to pride themselves on
this rejection, as if their identity as artists depended on it. You want
desperately to fit in with this group. What creative methodology will you
likely choose?
Of course, not every artist in the 1940s did choose to adopt the methods
and ideology of the Abstract Expressionists,247 though many did. The point
is not that everyone identifies with a particular group and adopts their
methodologies in order to signal their membership with the group. Instead,
it is that most people identify with some group and adopt the methodologies
of that group, thereby entrenching group methodology norms. We would
think it strange, for example, if an artist who was mentored by an Abstract
Expressionist, spent most of his time with other Abstract Expressionists,
attended Abstract Expressionist events, and so on, adopted primarily realist
methodologies in his work. This is because the conformity bias operates on
the peer or group level. Individuals conform their behaviors to those of their
peer group: those whom they perceive as being similar to them and whom
they identify with.248
The same holds true for creative and scientific communities. An
outsider might assume that all visual artists, or all scientific researchers
working in the physical sciences would consider themselves as belonging to
a unified group. This assumption would be wrong. Instead, creative
personnel tend to identify with those they define as being within their

247

In fact, it was the coming together of diverse artists with alternative interests that eventually led
to the Pop art and Minimalist movements. See id. at 25.
248
See, e.g., Marion Doull et al., Peer Support Strategies for Improving the Health and Well-Being
of Individuals with Chronic Diseases, 3 COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVS. 1, 2 (2005) (defining
a peer as “an individual who shares common characteristics with the ‘targeted’ group or individual”—
common characteristics might include “age, gender, disease status, socioeconomic status, religion,
ethnicity, place of residence, culture, or education”). For purposes of conformity, peer groups can be
defined surprisingly narrowly. See Michael Shiner, Defining Peer Education, 22 J. ADOLESCENCE 555,
557–58 (1999) (explaining that peer identities “derive from a multiplicity of sources” and that individuals
may harbor multiple and even conflicting peer identities based on relatively narrow criteria). A high
school student, for example, will not be driven by the conformity bias to dress and act like every other
student at her school, although an objective outsider might see all the students as belonging to the same
demographic group. See id. (cautioning that “it should not be assumed that age constitutes a sufficient
basis for identification between people.”). Instead, she will likely identify with a subgroup of students—
the “jocks” or the “band geeks”; the “punks” or the “cool kids”—and tailor her clothing, actions, and
tastes accordingly. See, e.g., John Kelly, 10 Types of Teens: A Field Guide to Teenagers,
HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM (May 26, 2010), http://lifestyle.howstuffworks.com/family/parenting/tweensteens/10-types-of-teens.htm [https://perma.cc/BAA4-UV3F].
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“field”—often a surprisingly narrow concept.249 Researchers working in
areas that might seem to an objective observer to be remarkably similar or
logically related to another field are nonetheless considered outsiders by
those on the inside.250 The infamous self-imposed divide among
mathematicians, physicists, and engineers, for instance, is so clichéd that it
has spawned its own series of mathematician-physicist-engineer jokes.251
And even within the field of mathematics, the cultural gulf between “pure”
and “applied” mathematicians is well-known.252 Each of these subgroups has
its own shared language, holds its own scientific conferences, and abides by
a distinct set of cultural and research norms.253
The identity-signaling function of conformity helps us understand not
only how methodology norms become entrenched but also how they become
overenforced. This is in part because peer groups define themselves not only
by what they are but also by what they are not. Thus, the young artist who
aspires to the Abstract Expressionist school will choose not to adopt realist
techniques in order to signal his identity. Further, the rest of the group will
also work to prevent him from adopting these techniques. If he did so, it
would dilute the group’s identity, which is based not only on the presence of
abstract, individualistic expression but also on the absence of realism. Each
member has an incentive to police the group’s other members to ensure the
249
See Mary Henkel, Academic Identity and Autonomy in a Changing Policy Environment,
49 HIGHER EDUC. 155, 167 (2005) (explaining how “early specialisation” within a particular scientific
field helps establishes a discipline-based identity among scientists).
250
But see id. at 167 (noting that the degree to which this is true may be discipline-specific and
explaining that “[a]s compared with physics” the authors found “less evidence among biological scientists
of shared myths or emotional commitment to the idea of a disciplinary culture or community”).
251
See, e.g., Chris Riesbeck, A Mathematician, a Physicist, and an Engineer…, NW. ELECTRICAL
ENGINEERING & COMPUTER SCI., http://www.cs.northwestern.edu/~riesbeck/mathphyseng.html
[https://perma.cc/YL8M-DCV4]. A typical example:

A mathematician and an engineer are sitting at a table drinking when a very beautiful woman walks
in and sits down at the bar.
The mathematician sighs. “I’d like to talk to her, but first I have to cover half the distance between
where we are and where she is, then half of the distance that remains, then half of that distance, and
so on. The series is infinite. There’ll always be some finite distance between us.”
The engineer gets up and starts walking. “Ah, well, I figure I can get close enough for all practical
purposes.”
Id. This joke also incidentally highlights the tendency for certain academic disciplines to define
themselves in a gendered way. Though this, too, has implications for creative collaboration, a full
treatment of the topic is unfortunately beyond the scope of this Article.
252
See, e.g., Aleksandar Makelov, Pure v. Applied, EXCLUDED MIDDLE (Feb. 15, 2016),
https://amakelov.github.io/2016/02/15/Pure-vs-applied.html [https://perma.cc/PU9P-MLZM].
253
See Henkel, supra note 249, at 167 (explaining how scientific identities are based in part on
“rigorous training and specialisation in a discipline . . . within which the focus, theoretical base,
methodologies and epistemic criteria have been developed.”).
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group identity remains intact. The group, concerned with identity and
conformity, thus actively rejects alternative methodologies—radio
astronomy in the case of astronomers, radio technology in the case of
telephone engineers, and representational forms in the case of Abstract
Expressionists—even when in hindsight, doing so will delay significant
creative and innovative advances.
The conformity analysis for methodology norms plays out similarly for
research priority and evaluation norms. The information-cost- reducing and
identity-signaling functions of conformity will lead groups to hew to specific
research priority and evaluation norms even when departing from these
norms would be socially beneficial.
D. Theoretical Implications of Anti-Innovation Norms
1. Free Riding vs Other Innovation Dilemmas
It is now canonical to begin any exploration of IP and innovation law
with a description of the problem of information as a “public good”—and
the market failures that arise from the threat of free riding on others’ creative
efforts.254 Free riding has become the central dogma of IP and innovation
law. It has provided the basic explanatory framework to understand why
governments must intervene in the markets for creative products and how to
design such interventions. IP law itself, a key focus of legal scholars
interested in innovation policy, is designed primarily to address free riding
through time-limited property rights.255 But this singular focus on free
riding—while perhaps justified more narrowly in the design of IP rights—
has biased scholarship on innovation policy more broadly.
All of the studies on social norms and innovation synthesized in Part I
focus almost exclusively on how creative communities rely on social norms
to regulate copying behavior. The free-riding lens thus serves to frame the
case studies, to focus the questions asked on one dilemma: how do innovator
communities address the threat of copying? The studies’ conclusions are
varied: in some cases, copying turns out not to be a threat at all; in others,
social norms punish copying only when it comes too close to the original;
yet in others, social norms punish copying of even general ideas.256 Yet, this
focus on the regulation of copying behavior blinds this scholarship to other
potential innovation dilemmas faced by innovator communities.
Rather than focusing on free riding as a key impediment to innovation,
our analysis of three anti-innovation norms (research priority, methodology,
254
255
256
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and evaluation norms) reveals another crucial innovation dilemma: that of
boundary-crossing. The dilemma can be framed as follows: many socially
beneficial innovations require identifying and solving problems at the
intersection of multiple innovator communities, but incentivizing and
coordinating such collaboration is hampered by social norms that aim to
preserve community boundaries. Inside a firm, this dilemma can be reframed
as a team assembly and coordination dilemma arising from clashing research
priorities, methodology, and evaluation norms of team members.
Although our focus here is on boundary-preserving social norms, and
the boundary-crossing innovation dilemmas that arise from them, this focus
is not intended as an exhaustive list of the types of innovation dilemmas that
these communities face. To the contrary, boundary-crossing is one of many
additional innovation dilemmas that are obscured by the singular focus on
free riding. In recent work, Brett Frischmann, Michael Madison, and
Katherine Strandburg have called for a more systematic analysis of
“knowledge commons”—which they define broadly as solutions to
innovation dilemmas.257 Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg similarly
recognize that “knowledge commons may confront diverse obstacles or
social dilemmas, many of which are not well described or reducible to the
simple free rider dilemma.”258 Among the important innovation dilemmas
that these authors identify are infrastructure dilemmas (related to the
construction of shared platforms and data-processing systems) and dilemmas
related to the coordination of research when there is only a scattered market
for innovations (such as research on orphan diseases or diseases that affect
only the poor).259 Broadening our focus from free riding to other innovation
dilemmas also highlights the limits of IP law to address them, inviting
consideration of other, often neglected, policy interventions beyond IP law.
Finally, an almost exclusive focus on free riding and on the ability of
social norms to replace IP law has not only obscured other innovation
dilemmas, it has also disconnected the emerging literature on IP and social
norms from the broader literature on law and social norms. In contrast to the
literature on IP and social norms, this broader literature has paid close
attention to the dark side of social norms. Our analysis of the sociological
and psychological bases of anti-innovation norms brings the literature on IP
and social norms in conversation with this broader literature by showing how
research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms can fit within the
257
Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg, Conclusion, in GOVERNING
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 469, 469–70 (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J.
Strandburg eds., 2014).
258
Id. at 471.
259
Id. at 471–72.
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interpretive framework developed by law and social norms scholars. It also
advances this broader literature by providing a psychological explanation
that expands upon the prevailing rational-choice and game-theoretical
analyses. We expand on these two contributions below.
2.

Engaging and Expanding On the Broader Law and Social Norms
Literature
The broader literature on law and social norms, and in particular the
work of Russell Hardin260 described above, explains that social norms that
are welfare reducing for society at large (or “norms of exclusion”) often
emerge because they are welfare enhancing for core members of particular
social groups. Thus, in these models, socially harmful social norms emerge
through the self-interested actions of core group members.261 As we
summarized above, a key characteristic of “norms of exclusion” is that they
are most commonly enforced upon marginal group members: they work by
changing the interests of such marginal group members “to get them to act
in conformity with the interests of the core of the group.”262
Our description of anti-innovation norms fits quite well with this
existing narrative in the broader field of law and social norms. Take, for
example, the research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms that
emerged in communities of astronomers that prioritized the optical
exploration of the skies. Their maintenance can be explained in part as a
result of competition for scarce resources—namely, public and private funds
to carry out research related to outer space—between groups of optical
astronomers and radio engineers. Indeed, a complementary line of inquiry in
the sociology of expertise describes the interaction between distinct expert
groups as one of constant competition for control over who gets to address
and solve particular social problems.263 Similarly, several of the examples
explored in Part II demonstrate how core community members of innovator
communities, who helped develop and steer the community’s research
priorities, methodology, and evaluation norms, enforce those norms onto
marginal community members. In innovator communities, these marginal
community members can often be trainees—this was indeed the case in the
Abstract Expressionism community, where core, established group members
enforced their group’s social norms on trainees who wished to adopt more
realistic approaches to painting.264
260

HARDIN, supra note 26.
Id. at 72.
262
Id.
263
See, e.g., Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Community
Approach, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89, 108 (2015) (synthesizing scholarship on expert communities).
264
CRANE, supra note 130, at 25.
261
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Hardin formalized this explanation for the emergence of norms of
exclusion as follows:
1. F is an effect of X;
2. F is beneficial for G;
3. F maintains X by a causal feedback loop passing through G.265

Here, F is a signal of group identification; X is the social norm at
issue; and G are the members of the relevant social group. We can work
out this formal representation with a particular example and illustrate how
a particular social norm can become overenforced.
Take X as the norm specifying the research priority of visual exploration
of the skies, linked to the methodology norm of optical telescopy. Take F as
a signal of group identification with astronomy arising from this norm. Take
G as the members of astronomy innovation communities. The norm of the
primacy of the optical exploration of the skies serves as a signal to identify
“true” or “core” astronomists (Step 1). In turn, this signal benefits group
members by leading to easier publication in peer-reviewed journals in
astronomy, access to public and research funds, and more reputational
benefits (Step 2). Identification with the research priority, methodology, and
evaluation norms of the astronomy community thus maintains the norm of
optics research priority through a causal feedback loop passing through the
members of the relevant group.
The key to understanding this feedback loop is to realize that core group
members who strongly identify with the group are likely to spend more of
their time in it than members who identify more loosely with the group. Core
members will spend more time developing the research priorities,
methodologies, and evaluation norms of the group.266 Hence, these norms are
likely to become more extreme as time passes, not because the group as a
whole desires this consequence but because of the individual incentives of
the core members of the group. Note how this feedback loop strengthens
these norms, led by the preferences of core group members, but is unrelated
to the potential coordination benefits of research priority, methodology, and
evaluation norms, serving simply as a signal of group membership—in effect
leading to their overenforcement.
In Posner’s signaling model, research priority, methodology, and
evaluation norms also function as signals to other community members. But
they do not signal group identity per se; rather, they provide evidence of
being a hardworking, rigorous teammate—in other words, someone worth

265
266

HARDIN, supra note 26, at 82 (emphasis omitted).
See infra Part III.B.
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collaborating with (a good type). Nevertheless, and as predicted by the
signaling model, many marginal good types with idiosyncratic preferences
will either subsume those preferences to send this signal or risk being
shunned by their communities. In our case studies, those marginal members
are likely individuals who are interested in unusual research problems or in
unorthodox (or recombinant) methodologies.
We can also view research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms
through the lens of the esteem theory of norms. Introducing a desire for the
esteem of others into a model of individual preferences can produce social
norms that shift the preferences of marginal group members in socially
harmful directions (or what McAdams and ourselves have called norm
“overenforcement”). This is particularly the case if core community
members who enforce these norms are high-status, while marginal members
are low-status.267
Our analysis adds to and deepens these models by providing a novel
psychological account of the modeled behaviors. In other words, the broader
sociology literature attempts to explain how norms emerge based on
individuals’ behaviors, but it fails to give a full accounting of why individuals
act as they do. The two psychological mechanisms we outlined in this Part—
the status quo and conformity biases—help fill this gap.
For instance, due to the conformity bias, core group members—those
who identify strongly with a particular group—have enhanced incentives to
adopt and enforce the research priorities, methodologies, and evaluation
norms of the group. Because these individuals’ personal identities are tied so
closely to the identity of the group, the maintenance of these identities, and
the psychological benefits that accrue from them, depend on robust norm
enforcement.268 This strong enforcement by core members, in turn, gives
peripheral members—those who may not identify quite as strongly with the
group—a choice. They can either hew more closely to the norms being
enforced by the core members or seek the tangible and psychological
benefits that come with membership elsewhere—a different group for
instance.269 Thus, an artist who is uncomfortable with the stringency of the
norms being enforced by core Abstract Expressionists might seek the
psychological benefits of group membership in another group like the
Minimalists. Or, if he identifies more strongly with Abstract Expressionism
than Minimalism, he might bite the bullet and adhere to the core Abstract
267
McAdams, supra note 20, at 416 (“The opinion of those who are highly esteemed tends to be
valued more than the opinion of those who receive low esteem. Thus, high-status individuals will have
relatively more influence on the creation of new norms.”).
268
See supra Section II.C.3.b.
269
See id.
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Expressionists’ norms, even if they are more rigid than he would prefer.
Either way, the norms become more extreme over time, as the models
described above predict.
The status quo bias also helps explain the behaviors of both core and
peripheral group members in these models. Core members of groups are
those who have spent significant time with the group. They are thus most
likely to fall prey to the sunk cost fallacy and cognitive dissonance.270 This
will cause them to resist any departure from established norms. Because they
have spent the most time following these norms, the departure could be
interpreted (by themselves or others) as an admission of previous failure.271
For the same reason, i.e., to maintain the perception that their investments in
a particular course of action were not wasted, these core members will
enforce the norms on others in the group.272
The peripheral members, for their part, have not invested as much time
following particular norms as the core members, so they may be less subject
to sunk cost and cognitive dissonance considerations. But they will still be
swayed by loss aversion—the enhanced regret that comes when a failure
results after a departure from accepted norms.273 A new astronomer, though
she has not invested the same resources in optic methods as her older peers,
may nevertheless worry about using radio techniques simply because she
will be judged more harshly by these peers if this approach fails.274 When
potential failures are weighted more heavily than potential successes, this
might be enough to keep peripheral members from branching out. As
peripheral members fall in line, they will themselves become subject to sunk
cost and cognitive dissonance concerns, thereby moving closer to the core
and further entrenching the norms of the group, as the functionalist model
predicts.
III. ANTI-INNOVATION NORMS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As discussed in Part I, the existing literature on social norms and
innovation makes three main points. The first is that social norms can act as
innovation enhancers by appropriating the traditional functions of IP law. As
we demonstrated in Part II, however, this account is incomplete because it
ignores the many instances in which social norms may hinder, rather than
promote, innovative activities.
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272
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274

See supra Section II.C.2.b.
See id.
See id.
See supra Section II.C.2.a.
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The second and third themes that emerge from the social norms and
innovation literature concern the interaction between norms and IP law.
Scholars have pointed out that IP law and social norms are interdependent,
in the sense that IP has the potential to either enhance or reduce the
innovation-promoting function of social norms.275 Relatedly, these scholars
ask whether, given a choice, it is IP or social norms that present the best
vehicle to foster innovation in any given context. While not incognizant of
some potential downsides of social norms (like the unfair or nonuniform
imposition of sanctions, or the potential for self-help measures to escalate
into violence), they often answer this latter question by citing the relative
advantages of social norms over formal IP law—advantages like reduced
social costs and increased tailoring to the needs of particular innovative
communities.
In this Part, we expand the conversation beyond the IP/social norms
dichotomy previously presented in the literature. We agree, in general, that
IP can interact with innovation-enhancing social norms in either positive or
negative ways. We also agree that based on the precise nature of this
interaction in any given context we might choose whether we want a regime
that relies on formal IP law, social norms, or some combination of the two.
But, as our elucidation of anti-innovation norms illustrates, this debate
ignores the fact that not all social norms that arise in innovative communities
are innovation enhancing. Once we shift our focus from social norms-as-IPsubstitutes to a broader understanding of social norms that includes their
anti-innovation features, it becomes evident that formal IP law, though it can
do much to address anti-innovation norms, is also inherently limited in its
ability to do so. This realization forces us out of a narrow IP-or-norms
worldview and requires us to adopt a broader vision of innovation policy.
We expand on that broader vision here. First, we ask what formal IP
law might do to address anti-innovation norms. We conclude that it is a
necessary, though not sufficient, tool.
This leads us to this Article’s main theoretical insight: that the
innovation literature, with its focus on either IP or substitutes for IP (like
pro-innovation social norms) has been hindered by its narrow focus on
solving the public goods (or free-rider) problem. Though addressing this
problem is surely an important component of innovation policy, our
elucidation of anti-innovation norms demonstrates that it should not be the
only component. Indeed, the anti-innovation norms we have identified in this
Article have little or nothing to do with the public goods problem formal IP
law is designed to solve.
275
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Instead, anti-innovation norms influence the types of innovation a
particular individual or team is likely to undertake by hindering productive
knowledge recombination across community boundaries. Rather than pose a
free-rider problem, then, anti-innovation norms pose a boundary-crossing
innovation dilemma.276 Because IP law is designed primarily to address the
free-rider problem, it is unsurprising that it cannot fully correct antiinnovation norms. In other words, strengthening IP protection will do little
to change the background anti-innovation norms at work in a community,
leading at best to more of the same type of innovation within a community277
but failing to increase socially valuable boundary-crossing creativity. As we
show in this Part, certain IP doctrines such as nonobviousness in patent law
and attribution rights in copyright can work at the margins to impact the
direction of innovative activity. Nevertheless, when anti-innovation norms
are at work, IP (or its substitutes) will almost always be an insufficient
intervention to correct them. Again, this prompts us to broaden our vision to
consider other policy interventions—both private and public—to address
anti-innovation norms.
Taking the first steps in this direction, we offer some concrete policy
solutions to the anti-innovation norms problem. Because creativityenhancing collaborations are risky and have large public benefits that cannot
be fully internalized, we propose that public interventions are in order. We
focus on novel funding regimes and tax credits as examples. We stress,
however, that these proposals are preliminary in nature and should serve
mainly to highlight the need for creative solutions that go beyond the narrow
boundaries of IP.
A. What IP Can—and Cannot—Do to Address Anti-Innovation Norms
The IP system is generally understood as a means of efficiently
incentivizing innovation.278 Under the traditional, utilitarian account of IP,
exclusive rights are granted to creators to encourage them to create things
which, for various reasons arising from the public goods nature of
intellectual products, rational actors would not create otherwise.279

276

See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 32, at 671 (criticizing “functionalist
accounts” of IP for too myopic “a focus on excludability as a solution to public goods problems [which]
can lead to isolated analysis of boundary problems”).
277
Increasing patent protection could also lead, at worst, to a decline in innovative output by
weakening pro-innovation social norms and increasing hold up and patent thicket problems.
278
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1597–99 (2003) (“[C]ourts and commentators widely agree that the basic purpose of patent law is
utilitarian: We grant patents in order to encourage invention.”).
279
See supra note 50.
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But this corrective does not fully address the anti-innovation norms
identified here. IP, designed as it is to solve the free-rider problem, is
inherently limited in its ability to influence the social and psychological
factors that contribute to anti-innovation norms. Though we and others have
identified how the IP system might help tackle anti-innovation norms, an
understanding of the limitations of IP also prompts us to widen our vision of
what it takes to optimally incentivize innovation.
1. IP’s Failure to Address the Causes of Anti-Innovation Norms
As previously explained, IP is a market intervention designed to
overcome the free-rider problems associated with creating intellectual
products.280 The prospect of free riding undermines natural market incentives
to invest in new intellectual goods;281 IP aims to restore these incentives by
providing time-limited monopolies to those who create intellectual products,
allowing them to charge supracompetitive prices for their products and
recoup their investments.282
This standard account of IP law sheds light on its inability to address
anti-innovation norms. Put differently, the IP system is not designed to
directly address the social structures of underlying technological
communities. To the contrary, IP law is designed to increase the
appropriability of those innovations such communities would routinely make
were it not for the threat of free riding.283 The IP incentive, geared as it is
towards encouraging the organization as a whole to invest more resources in
creative projects generally, leaves it to the organization’s discretion to
choose what types of projects to focus on. In fact, this is traditionally seen as
a strength of IP law: IP rights’ reliance on decentralized market signals is
thought to drive the efficient allocation of resources to inventive activity.284
280

See Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, supra note 50, at 169.
David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting
Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 182 (2009).
282
See Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation, supra note 30, at 3 (explaining that IP
entitlements “enable innovators to charge persons who wish to obtain access to their creations, thus
enabling innovators both to recoup the costs of innovation and to make a profit on their activities”);
Menell, supra note 42, at 131 (explaining the traditional economic justification of IP as granting timelimited monopolies to inventors to “promote innovation and commerce requiring substantial up-front
investments and risk” and to offset “the differential fixed costs borne by innovators and imitators”).
283
See, e.g., id. at 146 (explaining that traditional economic accounts of IP “emphasize a reward
theory, seeing the appropriability of economic returns from investment as the driving force behind
technological innovation” (emphasis added)).
284
In comparative analyses of IP versus other regimes for incentivizing innovation such as
governmental subsidies and prizes, scholars argue that IP’s advantage is its reliance on market signals to
allocate resources towards inventions, rather than reliance on government agents to value the worth of a
particular research project and allocate resources accordingly. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Information and
Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969) (arguing that the copyright and patent systems
281
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But these market signals are filtered through the existing technological
environment, which is in turn bounded by anti-innovation norms. In other
words, research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms constrain how
communities perceive and respond to market signals. Conversely, consumer
preferences—and the resulting market signals—are also limited by
consumers’ abilities to articulate and recognize their own needs.285 In Lester
and Piore’s case studies of boundary-crossing innovations such as cell phone
technology, designer jeans, and medical devices, “interpretive”
conversations across community boundaries were not guided by preexisting
consumer preferences; rather, they served to articulate fuzzy consumer needs
and even to create new ones by finding new problems or reframing old
ones.286
An organization with adequate incentives, courtesy of the patent
system, to invest in research and development might still be reluctant to
undertake innovation-enhancing collaborative projects because its
decisionmakers are subject to the conformity and status quo biases.287 To be
sure, this organization will continue to be guided by its own research,
methodology, and evaluative norms to produce patentable and copyrightable
innovations. Yet patent and copyright law do not provide incentives for the
organization to challenge its own—often implicit and sometimes irrational—
anti-innovation norms and pursue other, more socially valuable innovations
through boundary-crossing collaborations. Patent and copyright law take as
a given the social and psychological constraints on innovation described in
Part II.
This point—that IP law cannot change a firm or a community’s
underlying social and psychological constraints on innovation—echoes

rely on market signals to ensure efficient channeling of research and development efforts towards
innovations consumers actually want); Menell, supra note 42, at 143 (summarizing comparative
institutional analyses of different policies to encourage innovation, and summarizing the standard critique
of governmental subsidies as running the risk of “misallocat[ing] resources, however, because the
government lacks adequate information to allocate, manage and monitor the use of subsidies effectively.
Moreover, the provision of subsidies by the government generates rent-seeking by potential recipients
which wastes resources directly and distorts the allocation of the subsidies”).
285
See, e.g., LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 78 (“[W]hile the new technologies of production
may have made it less costly to accommodate customers’ particular preferences, this is not the same thing
as saying that the customer actually knows what those preferences are.”).
286
Id. at 76 (“In the analytical view, the customer has preexisting needs, and the job of the developer
is to identify those needs and then to create products that meet them in an optimal way. . . . In the
interpretive view, the customer has no needs until they are articulated, and this articulation is what the
interaction between the designer and the customer is all about.”).
287
See supra Section II.C.2b (describing how the status quo bias might cause organizational decision
makers to steer clear of risky projects).

1125

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

theories of firm behavior developed in evolutionary economics.288 Under
evolutionary economic theories, firms are constrained in their “innovation
possibilities” by their learning structures and routines.289 In turn, a firm’s
learning structures and routines are cognitive concepts, “expressed in the
minds of technologists and managers [and] . . . reflecting the individuals
involved and the manner of their organization.”290 From this evolutionary
perspective, the set of anti-innovation norms described in Part II—and their
corresponding psychological maintenance mechanisms—serve to delineate
a firm’s innovation possibilities.
In applying evolutionary economics to technology policy, evolutionary
economist J. S. Metcalfe divides policy incentives into two kinds: those that
take a firm’s innovation possibilities as a given and those that seek to change
them.291 Policy levers such as IP law that “increase the pay-off to innovation”
by granting short-term monopoly profits fall squarely under the first
category.292 The incentives currently provided by the IP system simply do
not address underlying sociological and psychological constraints on
innovation.
Nor is it clear that IP, on its own, could fully do so. Because IP is
focused on time-limited monopolies and financial incentives, reforms to IP
doctrines, with the exceptions we explore below,293 may not have a
significant long-term effect on anti-innovation norms. Specifically,
economic analyses that explore how changes in patent and copyright law
may impact the levels of research and development focus predominantly on
288

See, e.g., Giovanni Dosi & Richard R. Nelson, Technical Change and Industrial Dynamics as
Evolutionary Processes, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 52, 75 (Bronwyn H. Hall
& Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010) (“[E]ach body of knowledge specific to particular technologies, that is,
each paradigm shapes and constrains the notional opportunities of future technical advance and also the
boundaries of the set of input coefficients which are feasible on the grounds of that knowledge
base . . . .”); J. S. Metcalfe, Evolutionary Economics and Technology Policy, 104 ECON. J. 931, 935
(1994); Richard R. Nelson & Bhaven N. Sampat, Making Sense of Institutions as a Factor Shaping
Economic Performance, 44 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 31–54 (2001); Richard R. Nelson & Katherine
Nelson, Technology, Institutions, and Innovation Systems, 31 RES. POL’Y 265, 267 (2002) (“Thus, for
scholars in both [evolutionary economics and new institutional economics], patterns of action need to be
understood in behavioral terms, with improvements over time being explained as occurring through
processes of individual and collective learning.”).
289
Metcalfe, supra note 288, at 935 (“Innovation possibilities set constraints on what can be achieved
and elements of these constraints are faced by all technologists working within the relevant institutions
and communities of practitioners.”); see also Nelson & Nelson, supra note 288, at 269 (“[E]volutionary
theory sees economic actors as at any time bound by the limited range of routines they have mastered.
Each of these has only a small range of choice. Further, the learning of new routines by actors is a time
consuming, costly, and risky thing.”).
290
Metcalfe, supra note 288, at 934; see also Dosi & Nelson, supra note 288, at 74–75.
291
Metcalfe, supra note 288, at 935–36.
292
Id.
293
See infra Section III.A.2.
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two features of IP rights: their breadth or scope and their length.294 Adjusting
the length or breadth of IP rights alters the payoffs from obtaining IP
protection, making innovation more or less appropriable. These changes do
not, however, alter the underlying social norms that influence a firm’s
innovation possibilities.
2. What IP Can Do
We have just explained why IP is ill-suited to comprehensively tackle
anti-innovation norms. This is not to say, however, that IP cannot mitigate
the detrimental effects of these norms. Indeed, we295 and others296 have
detailed in other work how IP—as currently structured or with changes to its
doctrines—may promote higher individual and team creativity.
a. Attribution rights in copyright and patent law
We have written elsewhere about how attribution promotes creativity.
Indeed, giving appropriate credit where it is due has been empirically shown
to lead to enhanced motivation for creative work,297 more creative outputs,298
and increased desires to share research results.299
The pro-creativity effects of attribution have implications for antiinnovation norms as well. Because attribution promotes creativity in the
ways identified, it can help creators overcome the status quo bias300 that
constrains them to familiar research priority, methodology, and evaluation
norms. And because it encourages sharing and disclosure behaviors, it can
help promote boundary-crossing collaborations that might not otherwise
occur.
IP law has a potential role to play in giving creators appropriate credit.
Copyright, for instance, which does not currently list actual authors in
registration statements of works made for hire, could begin to do so as a way
of providing some minimal attributional and reputational benefit to

294
See, e.g., Menell, supra note 42, at 139 (summarizing economic analyses of patent length and
breadth).
295
See, e.g., Bair, Psychology, supra note 115, at 349; Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Rational Faith:
The Utility of Fairness in Copyright, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1487, 1488 (2017).
296
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Patent Silences, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1603, 1603 (2016) (arguing that patents
may function as “boundary objects” that help facilitate collaboration among disparate communities).
297
See Bair, Psychology, supra note 115, at 340 (citing research showing that perceived fairness
promotes motivation for creative work and that creators perceive their environment as fair when they
receive appropriate credit for their work).
298
See Bair, supra note 295, at 1501–06.
299
Bair, Psychology, supra note 115, at 319.
300
See supra Section II.C.2 (explaining how the status quo bias can be explained in part by loss
aversion).
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creators.301 Patent law currently does require inventors to be named on the
patent, even when the patent has been assigned to someone else, but options
for making the attribution right in patent law more robust abound as well.302
In previous work, for example, one of us proposed an attribution system
patterned after the academic publishing model.303 Upon peer review, creative
advances singled out for special attention would receive coverage in
specialized outlets or the wider popular press.304
b. Nonobviousness doctrine in patent law
In patent law, the nonobviousness doctrine seeks to reward with a patent
only those inventions that would not have occurred (or would have been
significantly delayed) absent a patent incentive.305 In other words,
nonobviousness seeks to identify those inventions for which the prospect of
free riding would be most detrimental. Both economic and social theories of
nonobviousness view this doctrine as a mechanism to increase risk-taking by
innovators and firms by encouraging investment in projects whose success
is uncertain at the outset.306 Absent a nonobviousness doctrine, firms and
individuals would be incentivized to invest in “low-hanging fruit”—those
very incremental innovations requiring little investment, little creativity, and
small inventive leaps leading to predictable results.307
The nonobviousness doctrine raises the bar. It tells inventors: to obtain
a patent you must do something other than take the next incremental step in
your particular technological domain. For this reason, nonobviousness is
uniquely suited as a policy lever to mitigate anti-innovation norms. Investing
in boundary-crossing innovation involves social and economic risks:
flouting a community’s research priority, methodology, and evaluation
norms could lead to loss of status, loss of group membership, and loss of all
the pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits associated with such group status
and membership.308 In previous work, one of us proposed that the
nonobviousness doctrine should encourage the specific risks involved in
301

See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1794–
98 (2012).
302
See, e.g., id. at 1810–17; Bair, Psychology, supra note 115, at 349–50.
303
Bair, Psychology, supra note 115, at 350.
304
Id.
305
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1599 (2011); Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability,
7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (1992); Pedraza-Fariña, Sociology of Innovation, supra note 15, at 830–34.
306
Pedraza-Fariña, Sociology of Innovation, supra note 15 at 830–34.
307
See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[A] court must ask whether
the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.”).
308
See, e.g., Pedraza-Fariña, Sociology of Innovation, supra note 15, at 857–61.
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boundary-crossing collaboration.309 It could do so by evaluating whether the
invention at issue resulted from the recombination of knowledge from distant
technological domains.310 Recombination of distant knowledge domains
could serve as strong indicia of nonobviousness.311 Conversely, inventions
that recombine knowledge from domains that are routinely brought together
would merit more intense scrutiny.312
But, even if adopted, these proposals to modify the nonobviousness
doctrine would only work on an innovator who is both weakly influenced by
anti-innovation norms and strongly influenced by patent law. We can more
formally define such an innovator as one who, without a nonobviousness
standard that favors boundary-crossing, is equally as likely to pursue
boundary–crossing innovations as not.313 Such an innovator is likely an
innovator who, for a number of reasons, is on the outskirts of a particular
innovator community or already has ties with more than one innovator
community and thus is weakly bounded by any particular community’s antiinnovation norms. Perhaps she is a maverick and has a personality that likes
to flout convention; or perhaps she is a misfit whose ideas are routinely
rejected by core group members.314 To this inventor, a new nonobviousness
standard that rewards boundary-crossing may nudge her to resist antiinnovation norms and engage in boundary-crossing research.
Consider, however, that the ability to obtain a patent is one of many
elements innovators and firms take into account when choosing among
research projects.315 Further, mounting empirical evidence casts doubt on
whether patent incentives play any role in incentivizing inventor and firm
behavior in a variety of industries.316 In those fields where inventors are not
309

Id. at 861; Pedraza-Fariña, Social Origins, supra note 15, at 444–45; see also Michal Shur-Ofry,
Non-Linear Innovation, 61 MCGILL L.J. 563 (2016); Michal Shur-Ofry, Connect the Dots: Patents and
Interdisciplinarity, 51 MICH. J.L. REF. 55, 59 (2017).
310
Pedraza-Fariña, Social Origins, supra note 15, at 47–51.
311
Id.
312
Id.
313
Robert Merges uses a broader concept of the “marginal inventor” as “the one who without the
patent system is equally likely to pursue an invention as not.” MERGES, supra note 50, at 9.
314
Mavericks are “creative actors who . . . feel constrained in their work by existing conventions and
embark on challenging some of them.” Candace Jones et al., Misfits, Mavericks and Mainstreams:
Drivers of Innovation in the Creative Industries, 37 ORG. STUD. 751, 755 (2016) (citing HOWARD S.
BECKER, ART WORLDS (1982)). Misfits are “outsiders who . . . break or do not abide by social rules.” Id.
at 756 (citing HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963)).
315
See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (finding that patents “tend to be the [mechanism] least emphasized by
firms in the majority of manufacturing industries” to protect their investment in innovation); Lemley,
supra note 11.
316
See Lemley, supra note 11, at 1332–35.
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incentivized by patents, changing the obviousness standard will not affect
maverick or misfit behavior. And in those fields where patents do play some
role in guiding inventor behavior, for the vast majority of inventors and
firms, the nonobviousness doctrine is likely to only influence the choice of
research projects among the bounded universe of projects within a particular
community’s research priorities, methodology, and evaluation norms. From
a patent-centric perspective, it is certainly efficiency enhancing to tweak the
nonobviousness doctrine to nudge this patent-induced marginal inventor
towards boundary-crossing projects. But from a broader innovation policy
perspective, a more comprehensive toolkit is needed to address antiinnovation norms.
c. Fair use doctrine in copyright law
Though we have not explored the potential for fair use to address antiinnovation norms in other work, we believe it is worth mentioning here.317
The fair use doctrine provides a defense to copyright infringement318 based
on four factors.319 The first of these factors asks about “the purpose and
character of the use,”320 including whether the infringing use is
“transformative.”321 In an empirical study, Matthew Sag found that whether
a work is deemed transformative plays a critical role in determining whether
an infringing use will be deemed “fair” by the courts.322
To counter anti-innovation norms, the transformative inquiry could
more explicitly take into account some of the concerns we discuss here.
Courts could consider whether an infringing work was the kind of work that
tends to be underproduced due to anti-innovation norms. If the infringer
transported her use of the original across a boundary—from one community
of artists to another, or from one medium to another, for example—a finding
of transformativeness would be more likely to obtain. The goal, of course,
would be to encourage this type of socially beneficial creation by minimizing
liability for those who engage in it. These types of considerations may

317

We also hope to expand on these ideas in future work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of
copyright.”).
319
Id. (listing as fair use factors: “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”).
320
Id.
321
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (stating that an
infringing work is considered transformative if it “alter[s] the [infringed work] with new expression,
meaning, or message.”).
322
See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 76 (2012).
318

1130

112:1069 (2018)

Anti-Innovation Norms

already be present in the transformativeness inquiry to some extent,323 but an
understanding of the anti-innovation norm dynamic justifies a more explicit
and principled approach.
d. Patents as boundary objects
Apart from any particular IP doctrine, Dan Burk has argued that the
patent document itself may act as a “boundary object” that facilitates
communication and collaboration among disparate communities.324
According to Burk, the patent succeeds in this function in part because its
language is precise enough to speak to multiple communities yet ambiguous
enough to allow it “to maintain different identities in different social
worlds.”325 These features “provide a point of commonality where disparate
communities can collaborate and where contested meanings can be
negotiated[,] . . . facilitat[ing] communication and cooperation between
social domains.”326 In her study of physician–inventors, Katherine
Strandburg has also identified a role for patents as boundary-crossing devices
that facilitated collaboration between physicians and device industry
engineers.327 Thus, patents may serve a structural function—enabling
collaboration between different communities of innovators. On the other
hand, patents may interfere with boundary-crossing collaboration in
communities that adopt open-innovation models. As Clark Asay has argued,
patents favor centralized innovation and may place the type of decentralized
and modular innovation that takes place in open communities at a
disadvantage.328
B. Policy Prescriptions: The Potential of a More Robust Innovation Policy
Although the preceding discussion makes clear that IP can do much to
tackle anti-innovation norms, it should be equally clear that it cannot fully
solve the dilemma. Here, we discuss additional policy levers that could be
deployed to address the anti-innovation norms we have identified. As
323
See, e.g., Sony Comput. Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix, Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that a video game emulator was transformative despite “similarit[ies] of uses and function” with
the original because it created a new platform for game play).
324
Burk, supra note 296, 1623–24.
325
Id. at 1628.
326
Id. at 1624.
327
Strandburg, supra note 61, at 76.
328
Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Innovation, 74 MD. L. REV. 431, 432–37 (2015). Patents may
also entrench the status quo bias: the holder of a patent that has market power may be disincentivized
from searching for improvements, “as she already enjoys a dominant position in the relevant market, and
the improved version might not generate new demand but rather take sales away from the original
product.” Ofer Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation in Patent Law: Making Sense of Incentives, 50 IDEA
723, 734 (2010).
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explained, the sociological and psychological barriers to creativityenhancing collaborations make it unlikely that creative teams will engage in
these endeavors on their own. Further, the benefits that accrue to the public
from these collaborations (in the form of socially beneficial groundbreaking
innovation, the establishment of new lines of research, etc.) cannot be fully
internalized by the private parties that engage in them. And because the
innovation incentives that IP offers are agnostic as to the type of innovation
that occurs, private parties are much more likely to engage in less risky and
psychologically taxing (but also less socially beneficial) lines of research that
promise the same private benefits. For these reasons, legal interventions that
offer private incentives to engage specifically in creativity-enhancing
collaborative research are in order. We now discuss two of these: novel
funding regimes and tax incentives.
1. Collaborative Team Grants
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science
Foundation (NSF) are the primary governmental funding agencies for
scientific research in the United States. As such, they provide much of the
funding, in the form of grants, for biomedical and public health research
conducted at universities and research institutes throughout the country.329 Its
counterpart in the arts is the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).330
Although several existing NIH grants are designed to encourage
collaboration, none of them target the formation of boundary-crossing teams
that are so crucial to innovation and that anti-innovation norms discourage.
Rather, current NIH initiatives designed to foster collaboration are focused
more extensively on big data collection and annotation. Big data analysis is
often more about constructing a shared infrastructure for data analysis and
coordinating its collection than it is about generating new and innovative
ideas. Indeed, many of these projects “involve application of known methods
on a large scale to an important problem.”331 Similarly, the NEA funds
individual fields, such as dance, design, visual arts, music, literature, and
theatre, but does not currently emphasize collaboration across them.332 The
329

NAT’L INST. HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov [https://perma.cc/YS83-36DC]; NAT’L SCI. BOARD,
https://www.nsf.gov/nsb [https://www.nsf.gov/nsb]. See generally W. Nicholson Price II, Grants (draft
on file with author) (providing an in-depth examination of the NIH grant system as an innovation-lever).
330
See NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS, https://www.arts.gov [https://perma.cc/KVE8-563L].
331
Ronald N. Germain, Healing the NIH-Funded Biomedical Research Enterprise, 161 CELL 1485,
1489 (2015) (emphasis added); see also Bruce Alberts et al., Rescuing US Biomedical Research from Its
Systemic Flaws, 111 PNAS 5773, 5776 (2014) (“To combat the tendency for fields to become parochial,
agencies should develop funding mechanisms that encourage the growth of new fields, both by direct
support for new science and by a rigorous regular evaluation of existing programs.”).
332
See
Grants,
NAT’L
ENDOWMENT
FOR
ARTS,
https://www.arts.gov/grants
[https://perma.cc/F4KQ-EZEV].

1132

112:1069 (2018)

Anti-Innovation Norms

NSF funds a broader range of boundary-crossing opportunities under their
targeted “solicited interdisciplinary programs.”333 These grant opportunities
target research areas, such as BigData, Macrosystems Biology, and Regional
Climate Prediction, that the NSF identifies as priority funding areas.334
Nevertheless, unsolicited interdisciplinary proposals are likely to face
hurdles to receiving NSF funding similar to those facing NIH proposals
because, as the NSF itself recognizes, “there might not be an obvious natural
[core program] ‘home’ for every interdisciplinary proposal.”335
One possibility for overcoming anti-innovation norms, then, is to
introduce a grant mechanism at the NIH, NEA, and NSF that requires
collaboration across boundaries. At the NIH and NSF, such a mechanism
could solicit proposals from researchers from any disciplinary background
to research intractable problems whose solution requires the insights and
joint work of multiple technological domains. The grant could also be
expanded to include proposals from industry or industry–academia
initiatives (public–private partnerships) that specifically engage multiple
research communities and disciplines.336 Indeed, the NIH did enact, for a
period of seven years, a set of grants (the “Roadmap Grants”) that sought to
encourage the assembly of boundary-crossing teams.337 The Roadmap Grant
project was tethered to the “Common Fund”—a discretionary pool of funds
that each successive NIH Director can use to shape science policy during her
tenure.338 Currently, there is no grant equivalent to the NIH Roadmap Grant
for Interdisciplinary Research. Under several measures, however, the
Roadmap Grant project was very successful and worth replicating on a larger
scale.339 In other work, for example, we detail how the Roadmap Grant
facilitated research in the novel area of “oncofertility,” which deals with the
fertility issues of cancer patients.340 These prescriptions are also relevant to
other grant-making agencies both in science and technology and in the arts,
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See How Does NSF Support Interdisciplinary Research?, NAT’L SCI. FOUND.,
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See, e.g., Liza S. Vertinsky, Patents, Partnerships, and the Pre-Competitive Collaboration Myth
in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1509, 1526 (2015).
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such as the NSF, the Department of Defense, and the NEA, as well as private
grant-making institutions.341
To optimally design such a grant, grant-making agencies or institutions
should create stand-alone bodies specifically tasked with coordinating these
new grants and with researching effective team management practices.
Otherwise, existing bodies within these organizations given jurisdiction over
the grants may find themselves subject to the very same anti-innovation
norms (prioritizing specific research goals, methodologies, and evaluation
norms dictated by their preexisting agendas) the grant mechanism is
designed to overcome.342 The grants should also be administered with a
conscious degree of flexibility. A flexible approach aligns best with the type
of high-risk, uncertain research the grants are meant to foster. Grant
reviewers should allow some deviation from a team’s original proposal,
provided the overall subject matter of the research fits with the problem to
be addressed by the team.343
2.

Tax Credits for Collaborative Research Involving
Nontraditional Teams
Another mechanism by which the government may directly incentivize
the type of collaborative research discouraged by anti-innovation norms is
through tax incentives. Currently, tax incentives in the United States, in
contrast to those of other countries with intensive research and development
industries, are generic—they enable firms to deduct any research and
development costs. Precisely because tax credits are generic, any uniform
increase in tax subsidies is likely to lead to a dynamic misallocation of
resources by oversubsidizing research avenues dictated by anti-innovation
norms while doing nothing to discourage underinvestment in
interdisciplinary collaborative projects.344 To correct this distortion, the
United States could adopt a special type of tax credit requiring nontraditional
collaboration between industries that specialize in different technical

341
One private initiative that is structured to encourage boundary-crossing collaboration is the
research center “Janelia Farms” funded by the Howard Hughes Research Institute. Janelia Farms’
philosophy is to fund “risky, long-term projects that may often fall outside the realm of most funding and
academic goals. [These projects] bring together myriad disciplines – perhaps combining physicists,
computer scientists and biologists to build a new microscope. It’s not necessarily what you’d find in a
university
biology
department.”
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JANELIA
RES.
CAMPUS,
https://www.janelia.org/janelia-philosophy [https://perma.cc/TBQ5-75BV]. Janelia Farms research has
been successful in generating Nobel Prize-winning science in just eleven years of operation. Id.
342
See, e.g., Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 263.
343
Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration, supra note 15, at 34–35.
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See, e.g., Daniel J. Wilson, Beggar Thy Neighbor? The In-State, Out-of-State, and Aggregate
Effects of R&D Tax Credits, 91 REV. ECON. STAT. 431 (2009).
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domains (a cross-technology tax credit).345 The tax credit could be designed
so that it is available for a limited number of years per collaborative project.
Many other countries currently have a collaborative tax credit available
to industries, and the design of the U.S. cross-technology tax credit could
begin by looking to these models for initial guidance. For example, Belgium,
Denmark, Japan, and France provide tax credits for industries collaborating
in the development of products with universities or research institutes (thus
fostering clinical/industrial-basic research collaboration).346 Canada provides
a tax credit for all companies collaborating with eligible universities,
research institutes, or research consortia.347 Most of these tax credits focus
on one particular type of collaboration: that between basic science and
clinical/industrial communities. A tax credit for joint ventures between
industries in different technological environments is another possibility.
The advantage of a collaborative tax credit over collaborative team
grants is that it obviates the need for an expert panel—with all of its built-in
biases—to decide ex ante which projects are and are not worth funding.
Collaborative tax credits represent a uniform push towards collaborative
research. Of course, the uniformity of the incentive can also dull its impact,
since it cannot identify and target those projects likely to be more socially
significant.
CONCLUSION
The turn to social norms in IP scholarship signals an important shift in
legal scholars’ understanding of innovation dynamics. By challenging the
dominant narratives that placed IP rights at the center of innovation policy,
social norms have come to represent the promise of informal, low-cost
incentives.
But this line of scholarship has two important blind spots. First, it
remains shackled to overly narrow notions of innovation dilemmas that
privilege free riding as the central problem facing innovators. Second, it
neglects to fully explore social norms’ potential dark side.
This Article describes types of social norms that, rather than take the
place of IP as an innovation incentive, serve to delay innovation. We term
these types of social norms anti-innovation norms.
345
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Through our analysis of anti-innovation norms, we make three main
theoretical contributions to both IP and innovation theory, and to the field of
law and social norms more broadly. First, the set of anti-innovation norms
described in this Article is unconnected to the free-rider problem. Our
account thus challenges the dominant free-riding dogma in traditional IP
narratives, which views the threat of copying as the most important
innovation dilemma to be addressed through governmental interventions.
Second, shifting our focus from free riding to other innovation dilemmas also
highlights the limits of IP law to address them. Although changes in IP
doctrines, such as attribution rights in copyright law and the nonobviousness
doctrine in patent law, can address anti-innovation norms to some extent, IP
law cannot provide a comprehensive solution. Third, our account of social
norms is the first to merge macrolevel (sociological) and microlevel
(psychological) accounts of how social norms emerge and are maintained.
We thus expand upon existing analyses of norm emergence predominant in
the broader law and social norms scholarship. In so doing, we bring IP and
social norms literature into the conversation with the broader field of law and
social norms, a field that has long grappled with social norms’ potential
detrimental effects on society.
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